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Abstract
The turn of the nineteenth century saw a philosophy directed towards linguistic 
epistemology and when this influence reached academia in general it became 
known as the linguistic turn. In historiography this turn happened in the 
second half of the twentieth century and one direction was towards semantics 
and concepts. The focus on concepts can be seen as an essential focus in 
historiography after the linguistic turn because concepts carry meaning and are 
thus the link between language (text) and historical reality (context). A 
conceptual analysis is a reliable source for past meaning.
It is not only the German tradition of Begrÿsgeschichte that can be seen as the 
history of concepts, although this is the traditional understanding of 
conceptual history. Histories o f concepts can be socio-political as 
Begriffsgeschichte and works by Skinner, Pocock, Jonathan Clark and Stedman 
Jones, but also cultural like works by Stuart Clark, Foucault and Sandmo. In 
addition, there are similarities between gender history and conceptual history.
Gender history is also a consequence of the linguistic turn and identity analysis 
of gender includes conceptual analysis. Notable academics in this field include 
Denise Riley, Judith Butler, John Boswell and Foucault. These approaches 
have in common a belief in the power of essential concepts power over society 
and social changes.
Reinhart Koselleck and Michel Foucault are two historians with awareness of 
linguistics and their own conceptual methodology. Their approaches are, 
nevertheless, quite different and they use conceptual history for different 
purposes. Koselleck’s writing is linked to his ideas on modernity and he finds 
Begriffsgeschichte the most suitable method to describe changes. Modernity can be 
seen as a conceptualisation process. Foucault sees language as power, and thus
conceptual analysis is a critical method he uses to find the truth behind given !
I;power structures. Histories of concepts will always be critical disciplines. '
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Introduction
‘History of Concepts’ is a form for historiography that could only 
develop in a society influenced by a linguistic epistemology. This might not be 
obvious as ‘history o f concepts’ has roots outside the linguistic episteme and 
can resemble earlier histories of ideas. ‘History of Concepts’ is not a school of 
thought, but a term I use for historians that follow a common methodology 
independent of each other. Conceptual history in the form of Begriffsgeschichte is 
a German phenomenon with followers in parts of continental Europe, but the 
historians of this school are not the only historians of concepts. It will thus be 
too limiting to refer to Begriffsgeschichte as history of concepts H istoy o f Concepts: 
Comparative Perspectives does. ^The editors of this book are more concerned with 
the fact that the practice of conceptual history did not spread from German to 
French and anglophone historiography rather than investigating if there could 
be similar conceptual approaches in these countries. This dissertation would, in 
contrast, like to show that ‘history of concepts’ developed in other countries 
too; this was more of a parallel development than following the same lines.
Good education has always included being well spoken, and the 
research on the use of words has therefore been a respected field of study from 
classic rhetoric, via Enlightenment etymology, to contemporary linguistics. 
‘History of concepts’ can at a first glance seem to be a new term for 
‘etymology’, but there is more to this approach than that. History of concepts
 ^ ‘Although vastly influential in German-speaking Europe, conceptual history {Begiffsgeschichtè) 
has until now  received little attention in  English. This genre o f  intellectual history differs from  
both the French history o f  mentalités and the A nglophone history o f  discourses by positing the 
concept -  the key occupier o f  significant syntactical space -  as the object o f  historical 
investigation.’
This quote is from the back cover o f  H istoiy o f Concepts: Comparative Perspectives. Eds. Iain 
Hampsher-Monk, Karin Tilmans and Frank van Vree (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University 
Press, 1998)
follows meaning, not term and thus ‘history of meaning’ would be a more 
appropriate term than ‘etymology’. In linguistics, concepts have, in contrast to 
terms, connotations and denote meaning. It is necessary to have a pragmatic 
understanding of how a concept was used and to distinguish it from the use it 
has today. A history of concepts is dependent on the historical context, not 
only samples of earlier uses of the word. Consequently, semantic change is the 
main focus in the history of concepts. At first glance, a study o f semantic 
change can look as harmless as a study of political change and war, but the 
mentalité is obviously strongly affected by what people experience and the 
words in use. This is not too difficult to agree upon, but a conceptual historian 
like Reinhart Koselleck also believes that concepts create society and that 
semantic changes in concepts happen prior to political change. At other times, 
though, political change will demand a new vocabulary.
Concepts can only be understood by reference to both their textual and 
contextual relations. This is pointed out by James Smith’s reference to a 
comment by Quentin Skinner: ‘Skinner has remained “unrepentant” in the 
belief that “there can be no histories o f concepts; there can only be histories of 
their uses in argument”.’^  Skinner seems afraid that a conceptual analysis will 
be a purely textual investigation without any historical considerations. As 
historians working with concepts know, concepts do not have a life o f their 
own; they will always be in development with other aspects o f language. A 
history of concept is therefore only achievable if the possibilities and limits of 
concepts are understood.
Koselleck announced his programme for Begriffsgeschichte in Jirchiv fur 
Begriffsgeschichte in 1967, and he states there that the most important 
methodological criterion is that Begriffsgeschichte is historical-criticaL^ Despite this 
being a manifesto for Begriffsgeschichte, it seems that all historians working within 
the framework of history of concepts see this as a historical-critical method. A 
linguistic approach to history seems to be an opportunity for a more complex 
distinction of meanings than earlier historiography. History o f concepts does
^Schmidt, James; ‘H ow  historical is BegriffsgeschkhteP in History o f European Ideas 25 (1999) p.9 
3 Koselleck, Reinhart; ‘Richtlinien fur das Lexikon Politisch-Sozialer Begtiffe der N eu ze it in 
A rchivfur Begriffsgeschichte vol. X I (1967), p .83: ‘Unsere begriffsgeschichtliche M ethode ist in 
erster Lînie historisch-kritisch^
therefore have the possibility o f critically, through an investigation of language 
and context, deconstructing given truths. The power in the critique will be 
based on the combination o f a linguistic interpretation and an accurate 
historical methodology. This makes it different from the history of ideas as 
written by Arthur O. Lovejoy, Ernst Cassirer, Alexandre Koyre and Friedrich 
Meinecke, which has on the whole been about universal truth based on fixed 
ideas.
The critical aspect of the history of concept distinguishes this approach 
from the earlier discussion of historical ideas of Platonic eternity. This new 
tactic also makes direct attack on this earlier historiography, because it is not 
reflective enough. Lovejoy, for example, is anti-historicist in his approach as he 
is more concerned with how his ‘unit ideas’ always exist, rather than how they 
interact within their historical context Sandro Chignola writes that ‘though 
Koselleck does not openly take a position, his critique obviously is aimed at 
Arthur O. Lovejoy’s theoretical premises.’^  After the linguistic turn most 
historians would agree that ideas, concepts, mentality and ideologies are not 
entities with fixed meaning; they are living entities, developing with the 
historical context. Melvin Richter mentions that Lovejoy knew what was going 
on in Germany, such as sociology of knowledge, which Lovejoy thought could 
be combined with history of ideas.^ However, it seems to have had no 
influence in Lovejoy*s work or the development of American history of ideas.
When Richard Rorty published The Unguistk Turn in 1967^, it 
summarised the thoughts of the linguistic turn in philosophy and at the same 
time setting a date for the linguistic turn in historiography. It would be an 
exaggeration to say that this book had an influential impact on the historical 
writing. The traditional view is to see the linguistic turn as entering historical 
thought from literary theory rather than directly from philosophy. This is 
because the linguistic turn has been associated with a set of postmodern
 ^Chignola, Sandro; ‘History o f  Political Thought and the History o f  Political Concepts; 
Koselleck’s Proposal and Italian Research’ in H istoy o f Political Thought 23 (2002), p.518  
5 Richter, Melvin; *Beffiffsgeschichte and the History o f  Ideas’ in Journal o f the History of Ideas 48 
(1987),p.262
 ^The U ngiisüc Turn ed. Richard Rorty (Chicago and London: T he University o f  Chicago Press 
1967)
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thinkers such as Jacques Derrida and Roland Barthes. Within historical 
thinking, there is a tendency to see the linguistic turn as a negative interruption 
from the straight line of progress in the historical discipline — which just shows 
that the linguistic turn is truly a postmodernist phenomenon showing that 
there is no such thing as progress. The anxiety is that this turn would be the 
end of history; not in Fukuyama’s sense of the end of historical change,^ but 
the end of historiography as a discipline, its foundation of dealing with reality 
having been taken away. However, the linguistic turn is not only about 
limitations; it is also about possibilities.
There is not a consensus on how to define the linguistic turn. Georg G. 
Iggers writes about the linguistic turn as if it is a turn to purely textual 
historiography.  ^For him, the results of the linguistic turn were structuralism, 
semiotics, relativism and discourse history. Iggers receives support ftom Alun 
Munslow who also focuses on textualism and equates ‘the linguistic turn’ with 
a deconstructionist or deconstructive turn, which must be seen as a very 
narrow definition.^ For John E. Toews the ‘linguistic turn’ is a turn ftom the 
interest in ‘experience’ to an interest in ‘meaning’. He mentions both 
historians and philosophers in this famous review article, and for him the turn 
is part of a more general development o f a greater focus on meaning. Richard 
J. Evans groups Hayden White, Frank Ankersmit, Keith Jenkins, Patrick Joyce, 
Dominick LaCapra, and Beverley Southgate at ‘the extremes of postmodernist 
hyper-relativism’." None of these mentions the terms ‘concepts’ or ‘history of 
concepts’ as a phenomenon of the linguistic turn, but at least Toews has the 
meaning of concepts in focus.
As the linguistic turn it self is an ambiguous concept it can be seen 
either in a broad all including way or as a narrow highly defined concept. In 
this thesis ‘the linguistic turn’ will be founded on the assumption that, due to
’ See Fukuyama, Francis The end o f history and the last man (London : Hamish Hamilton, 1992)
8 I^ ers , Georg G.; Historiograply in the Twentieth Centuiy, From Scientffc Objectivity to the Postmodern
Challenge (Hanover, N E  and London: Wesleyan University Press 1997) chapter 10 ‘The
“Linguistic Turn”: The End o f  History as a Scholarly Discipline?’, p p .l 18-133
5 Munslow, Alun; Deconstructing History (London: Routledge, 1997), p .l6
10 Toew s, John E.; ‘Intellectual History after the Linguistic Turn: The Autonom y o f  Meaning
and the Irreducibikty o f  Experience’ in The American Historical Peview Vol. 92 (1987) pp. 879-
907
Evans, Richard J.; In Defence of History 2“'i ed (London: Granta, 2000), p.254
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the Jinguistic focus in philosophy and most academic disciplines, a linguistic 
epistemology^^ is the inevitable basis for all academic work — thus claimiag a 
broad definition. This fact is accepted by each of these academics to a greater 
or lesser extent, ‘The linguistic turn’ as a narrow concept exists in a variety of 
ways, which will be discussed in the first chapter. Linguistic epistemology in 
historiography brings a new focus on the question of how to reach a historical 
meaning. ‘History of concept’ is an attempt to answer this question of 
historical meaning.
After the linguistic turn, historiography becomes a discipline with a 
different aim to earlier historical writing. As Gabrielle Spiegel puts it: ‘The 
chief aim of modem historiography has become that of representing — rather 
than, as formerly, resurrecting — the past.’^  ^ This can be linked to Zygmunt 
Bauman’s definition of postmodern intellectuals as interpreters.^^ All post- 
linguistic turn theory focuses on meaning, representation, symbols and the 
means of reaching these through interpretation. The linguistic turn is therefore 
most prominent in scientific historical disciphne because the change there is 
more radical. In German historiography, where a hermeneutic tradition was 
already emphasizing the interpretation process, it is difficult to point out the 
change that is represented as the linguistic turn in other countries.
The topic of this dissertation was chosen because I claim to see a 
common methodology in the historians working on concepts. First o f all, 
concepts seem to be a bridge between linguistic understanding and historical 
reality. Interpretation, and not explanation, is therefore the method in focus. 
This might not seem new, but when it is combined with the thought that 
conceptual analysis is the best line o f attack because concepts are the only 
bridges between a historical reality and a linguistic understanding, then a 
‘history of concepts’ emerges as a separate discipline. It is also interesting to
Epistemology is die science o f  knowledge; a linguistic epistemological paradigm is therefore 
a theory where all k n ow led^  has its foundation in language, as opposed to from fixed 
metaphysical ideas or from experience.
"  Spiegel, Gabrielle M.; ‘Memory and History: Liturgical Time and Historical Time’ History and 
Theoy 41 (2002) p. 161 
Bauman, Zygmunt; Hegislators and Interpreters. On modernity, post-modemity and intelkctuak 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), p.5
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see how historians who ate linguistically aware, develop the same sort of 
history even though they cannot be seen to be related in any other way. 
Linguistical awareness seems to create a conceptual interest. However, those 
interested in concepts take some precautions when examining a purely textual 
historiography and are true to the more traditional, historicist contextuaUsm.
This dissertation tries to show that history of concepts was something 
new, that the approach is different to the earlier history of ideas and that this 
new approach is dependent on linguistic epistemology. The first part, 
therefore, examines the theory that developed after the linguistic turn, both the 
textualist and the contextuaUst approaches and how they are linked to 
concepts. The second part looks at history o f concepts and its relationship to 
political and social history, cultural and intellectual history and gender history 
respectively. The purpose is to show the variety of concepts possible in a 
conceptual analysis, but also to show how history of concept has been more or 
less part o f the different disciplines. Begriffsgeschichte looks at essential concepts 
{Gmndbegriffif^ , but as it will become apparent, not all concepts are easily 
defined as essential concepts. The third part whl focus on two historians in 
particular; Reinhart Koselleck and Michel Foucault. For those who are 
conscious about conceptual method and history, there are possibilities to use 
this method for specific purposes. Koselleck uses this to prove the uniqueness 
o f modernity and the conceptualisation of time in modernity. Foucault uses 
conceptual method critically to prove how injustice has occurred because of 
the language in which it has been framed.
18 I will use the term ‘essential concept’ for the German Grundbegriffe as this seems to be the 
tradition. However, they could have been translated basic or foundational concepts. In 
Begriffsgeschichte it is important that these concepts creates a foundation for the emergence o f  
m odem  society.
13
Part I 
Theory
14
1 Histoiy, Language and Concepts
[.. .]it need hardjy be said that the history o f historiogrcphy is not by any means to 
regarded as a branch of literary criticism!^
The tide of this thesis uses the term ‘the linguistic turn’ which su^ests 
that this is a defined phenomenon that it is easy to classify things by. However, 
as mentioned in the introduction, it is more the case that there are several 
linguistic turns; some of them having more in common than others. What they 
all have in common is the inclusion of at least one linguistic aspect into a 
discipline’s methodology creating a linguistic mode of explanation and that 
these turns to place from the mid 1960s to the mid 1980s, The histories of 
concepts thus referred to in the tide are historiogtaphy written from the 1960s 
onwards. Some historians were earlier than others in being inspired from 
linguistics, literature theory, linguistic philosophy or other disciplines which 
already had gone through a linguistic turn. In the variety of linguistic 
historiography there were not all that gtew an interest in concepts. This 
depended on the theoretical or philosophical background of the approach.
In the linguistic landscape
The linguistic turn has varied in different countries depending on the 
theories and philosophies by which they have been influenced. The main 
influences are analytical philosophy (pragmatism), poststructuralism, semiotics 
and hermeneutics. Theoretically it was a division between French-American 
textualism, based on textual structuralism in France and literary theory in 
North America, and an Anglo-German contextual approach to history 
represented by American pragmatism in Britain and hermeneutics in
Butterfield, Herbert; M an on his Past. The Study of the History of Historical Scholarship (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1955), p.3
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Germany/^ In Britain there was, in addition, a later poststmcturaJist movement 
which supports the contextual view based on textual premises. Contextual 
history ori^nates in previous historiogtaphy and was thus not as much 
disputed as textual historiogtaphy. Now, some decades after the start of the 
turn, the contextual project still receives more support than the textual attempt. 
Since the national approaches have been different, there has been more stress 
on differences than similarities. Few have commented that these approaches all 
have a root in the linguistic turn and in a linguistic episteme.
In an article ftom 1982, Hayden White reflects on the linguistic 
developments in intellectual history. He concludes that there are three paths 
historians have thread, and that they
divide father evenly into those w ho (1) take their stand on one or more o f  
the classical hermeneutics o f  the nineteenth century (Hegel, Dilthey,
Marx, Freud) or their twentieth-century avatars; (2) adopt the neo- 
Humboldtian, philological theory o f  language lately revived and refined 
by Gadamer and Ricoeur; or (3) openly advert to the post-Saussurian 
theory o f  the linguistic sign, o f  which both Foucault and Derrida, though  
in different ways, are exponents.*®
This thesis does not include the structural approaches - classified by White as 
(1) — as linguistic, but the reconstruction attempted by (2) and the 
iuterpretarion attempted by (3). Histories of concepts is seen as being between 
these two approaches including both reconstruction and interpretation; the 
reconstruction of past discourse, interpreted to our discourse. Histories of 
concepts are part o f the linguistic turn, first o f all because ‘concepts’ as 
investigated in histories of concepts is a concept found in linguistic 
terminology. Histories of concepts use theory and terminology that has 
originated in linguistics, literature theory, political sciences and philosophy and 
not historiography, and must thus be seen as interdisciplinary. Secondly, 
histories of concepts are epistemologically dependent on linguistics. Language 
is seen as a foundation — the only foundation — for knowledge. This 
preferences interpretation over explanation in.
Foucault was inspired by French structuralism, Hayden White was inspired by the Canadian 
literary theorist Northrop Fry, Quentin Skinner was influenced by American Speech A ct theory 
and the Koselleck has his foundation in hermeneutics although Begriffsgeschichte.
White, Hayden; ‘M ethodology and Ideology in Intellectual History: The Case o f  Henry 
Adams’ in Modem European IntelkctualHistoiy. Reappraisals and New Perspectives Eds. D om inick  
LaCapra and Steven L. Kaplan (Ithaca, N Y  and London: Cornell University Press, 1982), p.283
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The chronology of the development o f the different paths of the 
linguistic turn is quite difficult to follow, as there are several parallel paths. If 
we start to look at the philological inspired path which, amongst others, 
Koselleck threads along, it developed mainly within the history of political 
thought In Germany this develops from the late 1960s as a part of the 
reinvention of German social historiography. In Britain pragmatic, analytical 
philosophy influenced historians in the 1970s resulting in Pocock’s Politics, 
Language and Time. Esseys on Political Thought and History (1972) and Quentin 
Skinner’s works from the late 1970s, The Foundations of Modem Political Thought 
(1978). Britain also experienced a poststructuralist perspective of philological 
theory where linguistic criticism of Marxist structuralistic workers history 
developed in the 1980s and 1990s as poststructuralist historiography with 
Patrick Joyce strongly involved.
Foucault is the best-known historian down the post-Saussurean path. 
His first work. Madness and Civilisation, was published in 1961, but it was The 
Order of Things ~  in French in 1966 and translated to English in 1970
— which was to influence other historians. Parallel to, but also inspired by 
Foucault, is the development of gender history. Women’s history developed 
from the 1960, but got more and more founded on linguistics and the 
discipline thus changed name to Gender History. The post-Saussurean 
approaches are based on semiotics and thus have in common their focus on 
symbols. New Cultural History — and microhistory — should be included in 
this. Many were involved in the broad movement called New Cultural 
History'^. Carlo Ginzburg’s The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth- 
Century Miller was originally published in 1976, and thus started the interest in 
microhistory. Microhistory is based on narratives of the individual commoner. 
Narratives became important especially afterHayden White put narratives in 
the picture with Metahistory (1975) and this developed the interest in narratives 
in the early 1980s. Dominick LaCapra contributed also on textual history in the 
1980s. This is however on historiography and thus describes what had
The New Cultural History, ed. Lynn Hunt (Berkley. University o f  California Press, 1989)
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happened the earlier years. In his famous article from 1987, Toews look on 
linguistical historiography from the previous ten years.^°
Interpretation and Linguistic structure
The founding of linguistics as an analytical and not only historical 
discipline was an essential step towards the linguistic turn. Ferdinand de 
Saussure and his Course in General Linguistics is thus an important figure towards 
the change to a linguistic episteme.^^ Saussure developed a synchronic language 
theory where language was divided into two levels; langte and parole, which 
meant language as structure and language as uttered respectively. For most 
historians parole is the interesting level of research, but on the other hand, there 
are historians like Foucault who is interested in language structures. Saussure 
developed further a theory on the level of langue about the sign as a division 
between the signifier {signifiant) and the signified {signifie). When exposed to 
Saussurean linguistics some historians became interested in signifiers and their 
relationship with the signified. This semiotic approach gathered significant 
support in anthropology-inspired cultural history where symbols — signifiers — 
were analysed. History o f concepts, on the other hand, reached for the 
signified; not the word, but what it denotes, that is the meaning. Historians 
working with concepts have attempted to combine the abstract analysis of 
signifier and signified, to a more attractive study of signifier and signified in 
parole. Koselleck shows that this combination is possible for Begriffs^schichte 
because this tradition has roots in philosophical history of terrninology, 
semasiology and onomasiology.^
One of the basic understandings of Saussurean theory is that meaning 
is a function of language. This is to say that our common sense impression, 
that we articulate thoughts, is not correct. What we think is instead determined 
by language. ‘Man moves within the framework of structures — in this case
Toews, John E.; ‘Intellectual History after the Linguistic Turn: The Autonom y o f  Meaning 
and the Irreducibüity o f  Experience’ in  The American Historical RetdewSiol. 92 (1987)
2* Saussure, Ferdinand de; Course in G eneralU n^istics transi. Wade Baskin (London: Peter 
Owen, 1960) [First published in French in 1916]
22 Koselleck, Reinhart; ‘Begriffsgeschichte and social history’ in Economy and Society vol. 11 (1982), p. 
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linguistic structures — which he does not determine, but which determine 
him.’^  ^Even though we are determined by language, signifiers are arbitrary. If 
this linguistic understanding leads to metaphysical implications, this 
arbitrariness is responsible for changes in society. In a linguistic epistemology, 
how things are talked about matters most for how things are and how they 
develop. Not all historians of concepts take metaphysical implications of the 
linguistic episteme; at least not to the same extent as Koselleck, but 
Begriffsgeschichte values this metaphysical interpretation because it gives a 
possibility to understand past societies through theit use of concepts. 
According to Saussure, langue constitutes how we perceive reality. This is the 
foundation for textual structuralism, which seems to be an alternative to an in 
opposition of (economic) structuralists. Textual structuralism in historiography 
can often be equalled to poststructuralist historiography. Even though 
Foucault did not see himself as a poststructuralist, his historical writing is 
closer to textual structuralism than structuralism in the style of the Annales 
School. For him, the order of the discourse is determined by language and 
meaning is something intrinsic to concepts, making concepts indicators of 
power structures. ‘Structuralism is not a new method; it is the awakened and 
troubled consciousness o f modem thought.’^ ^
The belief in the power o f language that we find in linguistic 
epistemology has its foundation in the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. He 
starts Tractatus JLogico- Philosophicus with the proposition that ‘the world is the 
totality of facts, not o f things’.^  ^By this he means that things do not constitute 
the world by themselves; they would only do so when humans have described 
them as facts. Since language cannot, according to Wittgenstein, exist without a 
community needing a form of communication, the world would not emerge as 
it does without language. Another influential Wittgensteinian idea is the 
language game that is introduced in Philosophical Investigations '^ Language is 
described as a game because it is governed by rules, not laws. Grammar, 
semantics and syntax are rules that help us understand one other. These rules
23 I^ ers  , p. 120
2“* Foucault, Michel; The Order o f Things, (London: Routledge, 2002), p.226)
25 Wittgenstein, Ludwig; TractatusLoffco-Philosophicus (London: Routledge, 2001) §1.1, p.5 
28 Wittgenstein, Ludwig; Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001) § 7, p.4
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developed because they are beneficial for interaction. There are two reasons 
why an understanding of language games is beneficial for the writing of history. 
First, the mastering of one language game does not necessarily make you 
expert in another. Just as mastering draughts will not necessarily make you a 
chess player, it is possible to be good at one and have knowledge about 
another. For historians this means that they do not necessarily have direct 
access to past texts because languages have developed and the rules have 
changed. It takes effort on the part of the historian to learn the rules of a 
language game of the past. Secondly, being sensitive to the existence of these 
rules, historians make them a worthy field of study. The division of history 
into discourses and epistemes is dependent on this understanding of language. 
Discourses are different sets of language games. Historians interested in the 
development of concepts are interested in the mechanisms that have created 
the specific language game.
Implications of the discourse
Histories of concepts use discourse analysis, but just as different sorts 
of discourse analyses have evolved, the different histories of concept have 
made use of different discourse analyses. In the historical discipline a discourse 
is the framework itself or part o f the context, but the roots can be traced to 
textual analysis and rhetoric. Roland Barthes stresses the textual aspect of the 
discourse when he writes that ‘a discourse is a long “sentence” [...], just a as 
sentence, allowing for certain specifications, is a short “discourse”.’^ ’ His view 
opens a textual historiography. Despite history of concepts’ historical 
contextuaUsm, textualism in this form seems to have had some impact on 
conceptual historians. Foucault uses a structural analysis of past discourses 
which treats the past as a text. The technique of the discourse analysis is to 
look at a variety of texts and not to focus on what they are saying, but how it is 
said.
Historical discourse analyses are in the tradition of Thomas Kuhn’s 
theory of paradigms. John Pocock wrote in the early 1970 that he was much
27 Barthes , Roland; ‘Introduction to  the Structural Analysis o f  Narratives’ in Image, Music, Text, 
Essays selected and translated by Stephen Heath (London; Fontana, 1977), p.83
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influenced by the new method of history of science represented by Kuhn’s The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions^  ^ The theory of paradigms of intellectual 
discourse, instead of a continuous, organic development of history, shaped 
Pocock’s belief in discourses as the focus of historical research. There are 
parallels between Kuhn’s paradigms and Foucault’s episteme. Thomas Flynn 
adds that these theories by including both discursive and non-discursive 
practices can be compared to Wittgenstein’s language game.^  ^By an ‘episteme’, 
Foucault means
the total set o f  relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive 
practices that give rise to  epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly 
formalized systems; the way in which, in  each o f  these discursive 
formations, the transition to  epistemologization, scientificity, and 
formalization are situated and operate; the distribution o f  these thresholds 
[...]; the lateral relations that may exist between epistemological figures or 
sciences in so far as they belong to neighbouring, but distinct, discursive 
practises.®®
Foucault underlines that these discursive relations are not structures, but a 
practice.^^ This is one of the reasons Foucault did not want to be called a 
structuralist, and why he should not be called so. Discursive relations are 
something active between people, not a fixed structure, and will thus always be 
dynamic.
Interpretation of texts and reconstruction of context
Historiography after the fnguritic turn is characterised by a less focus 
on ejqplanation and more focus on reconstruction and interpretation. 
Explanation is often considered more scientific approach to historiography, 
but it is seen as less and less possible and reconstruction and interpretation is 
left as the only possibilities for historical knowledge. Reconstruction is 
connected to the recreation of historical contexts and thus one of the main 
features of contextualism. The interpretation o f the past often can often turn
28 P ocock,}. G. A.; Politics, 'Langage and Time. Essays on PoUticalThought and History (London; 
Methuen & Co, 1972), p .l3
25 Flynn, Thomas; ‘Foucault’s mapping o f  histoty’ in The Cambridge Companion to Foucault çà. 
Gary Gutting (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1994), p.30
3® Foucault, Michel, The Archaeology of Knowledge, Translated by A. M. Sheridan Smith (London; 
Routledge Classic, 2002), p.211 
3* ibid, pp.50-1
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to textualism. Most historical schools in the after the 1960s have had a 
combination of reconstruction and interpretation. This has made it somewhat 
difficult to differentiate between the ones who are traditional but linguistic and 
those who are postmodern. Postmodern historians do not have a division 
between text and context; the context is text and is thus treated textually.
Georg Iggers claims that historiography can no longer be seen as 
scientific with the postmodern and linguistic approach.^^ This is because both 
textualism and contextualism supports relativism. Textualism in historiography 
is not only the interest in past texts, but treating things — events, actions, 
people, discourses, photos — textually. This is, for many historians, an 
intimidating turn towards relativism. However, the attention is rarely on 
relativism because the different theories attempt to focus on some foundation. 
Traditionally, the foundation was the past itself, but due to a new 
understanding that we do not have direct access to the past, language is seen as 
this needed foundation. Relativism is both created and given credibility by 
contextualism. Concepts are relative terms that most ideally should be 
discussed by a contextual approach. Since the context is responsible for the 
meaning, the meaning will change with changing historical surroundings. Ideas 
or concepts are nothing without a context because without the people to use 
the terms, texts referring to them or there being a common understanding of 
what they entail, they lose any meaning and will be useless. On the other hand, 
relativism alarms many academics because relativism seems to take away any 
foundation for arguments, and causes and consequences seem pointless. 
However, this is not the case, because the context is the new foundation. Mark 
Bevir has even implied that the foundationaHsm created by contextualism is 
too strong.^^ He would rather base historical understanding on his post- 
foundationaHst intentionaUsm, which is based more on internal agreement 
within the historiological text, than correspondence with a context. Even in the 
light of Bevir’s criticism, the analysis of contexts become more and more 
important, and the historic discipline has a new purpose.
32 Iggets , p . l l 8
33 Bevir, Mark; T h e  Error o f  Linguistic Contextualism History and Theory 31 (1992) pp.277
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There are many ways o f differentiating. In the intersection of language, 
linguistic theory and historiography, it is possible to see two different paths; 
one analyzing language to discover further historical knowledge and the other 
using linguistic theory in historical research. The first approach is not very 
different from traditional historiography as the style of the text is not different, 
except that language becomes the new focus, just as monarchs, nations, class 
or women earlier have been made the focus. The approach applying linguistic 
theory to history, however, changes historiography dramatically because the 
past is no longer treated as something unique, but merely another text. What 
differentiates historians ficom other academics working with the past, in fields 
such as sociology, political science, economy, ethnology and anthropology, is 
the dealing with (he past for its own sake, as the epistemological impact o f time 
is always of basic interest to the histotian.^*  ^Historians are not only interested 
in how the past got us where we are today, but are also concerned with the 
past as a completed story. In addition historians pay attention to the 
uniqueness of the past, not only the attempts to find regularities that can 
explain our society, as a political scientist would. The historians treating history 
as text have not lost this feeling for the past as being the field of the historian. 
Therefore they are considered historians and not textual critics.
Contextualism is more influential than textualism in historiography and 
this is also the case in other interpretative disciplines such as art history and 
literary theory. There must be a basic relation between interpretation and 
context, as all interpretative disciplines seems to search for truth through 
context. The context is the essential background knowledge necessary for any 
sort of understanding, as interpretation is an organic action that needs human 
understanding. An early form of contextualism is hlstoticism, a direction 
within historiography already from the late eighteenth century. The 
individualisation of historical events made the historical surrounding more 
important, because the event could no longer be seen as an actor in a play of 
general laws, but something unique that only got its value and identity on its
34 Knutsen, Paul; Analytisk Narrajon, (Bergen: Fagbokfotlaget 2001) p.21 
33 Gaughan, Martin; ‘A rt/H istory between the Linguistic and Pictorial Turns” in Image and 
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own, in its own time. The post-linguistic turn contextualism, however, is not 
interested in the value o f the context as such. The interest lies in constructing 
context out of given texts because text and language are seen as the meaningful 
entities. The main difference between historicism and contextualism lies in 
different principles. In historicism, the context has intrinsic value; it is 
cherished as an example of pure, past human interaction. In contextualism, 
however, language has got intrinsic value as language is the beater o f factual 
reality. This is, needless to say, a result of the linguistic turn and the 
epistemological effects that followed.
History of concepts relates mainly to contextual history because it is 
searching for collective meaning in discourses. A concept is only interesting 
when it is used by a group of people in a discourse, creating a discourse. This 
definition of histories of concepts puts Koselleck and Foucault at the centre of 
the discipline; concentrating on collective meanings, while Skinner and the 
British contextualists, inspired by speech-act theory, put the a^ncy in centre. 
The discourse is the context that makes a conceptual analysis possible.
At the same time, histories of concept are textual because they analyse 
the past by textual analysis and must thus believe the past is some part of 
context. A recurring theme in post-linguistic turn historiography is that 
historians are trapped in texts so that they cannot access, or appeal to, objects 
outside the text.^  ^ This is an idea culled from Jacques Derrida. In his O f 
Grammatologj! he states famously that ‘there is nothing outside of the text’.^  ^For 
most historians this is hard to swallow, because history, no matter how 
concerned with text, is linked to the past and other texts from the past. 
Conceptual historians manage to balance this by decoding the text without 
ignoring the context. However, deconstruction of the absolute truth of history, 
the way Derrida does it, does not close off the possibility of truth understood 
in another way; which Rayment-Pickard suggests is a contextual form of 
truth.^® Language can be seen as organizing a new focal point and thus ‘the 
real’ can only be referred to in an interpretive experience. T he death of the
38 Bevir, Mark; ‘H ow  to be an iatentionalist’ History and Theory 41 (2002) pp.209
37 Derrida, Jacques; O f Grammatohgy translated by G. C. S p iv ^  (Baltimore and London: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press 1998), p .l5 8
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author’ has not resulted in a death o f the context?^ In historiography, the 
historical text gets the honour of being analysed for its own coherence and 
ability to explain.
Mark Bevir tries to make a historical approach to work between the 
relativity of textuality and the dogmatic factors o f contextuality.
Although we can thus justify appeals to  objects outside the text, w e still 
have to acknowledge the theory-laden, and so provisional, nature o f  any 
knowledge w e daim  to  have o f  such objects. Knowledge cannot be certain 
— based on  appeals to pure facts. It m ust be provisional — justified by an 
anthropological epistemology that provides criteria in terms o f  which to 
compare different interpretations, that is, different sets o f  postulated 
historical objects.4®
By this approach, Bevir tries to combine the best form of approaches he 
criticises. He wants to be allowed the postmoderoist critique of reality outside 
text and still be able to use context or at least postulate a context. It can be 
questioned if this is possible. Bevir’s important addition to textuality is the 
historian’s opportunity to postulate intentions and a context. Even though this 
can be beneficial in the development o f an argument, die historian does not 
come nearer to the truth, which seems to be his goal. Hritoriography written in 
this way wUl still be a construct, an artistic achievement, rather than something 
scientifically provable. Bevir argues that he agrees that there are no given 
truths, but that he does not want to become irrationalist and therefore wiU 
reject the ideas o f Derrida, Foucault and Lyotard.'*^
The semantic content o f ‘concept’
Histories of concepts are a semantic discipline as much as they are a 
historical discipline. Analytical linguistic semantics emerged in the first half of 
the twentieth century, and is thus a younger discipline than history. Semantics 
deals with the meaning created by language and as long as history is seen as a
35 Bafthes’ article T h e  death o f  the author’ states that all interpretation o f  a text should be 
done to other parts o f  the text, n ot to anything outside the text. Thus the author becom es o f  
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hermeneutic activity, both semantics and history are interpretative disciplines. 
However, history has had a rather organic relationship to interpretation, 
reliving and feeling the past and melting the horizons of understanding. 
Semantics is analytical in its approach and thus creates a distance between the 
interpreter and the subject investigated. Whereas an organic approach might be 
too subjective, an analytical approach can be criticised for not including 
enough humanity. An historical conceptual analysis tries to understand human 
action by an analytical study of language thus avoiding criticism of being too 
abstract by investigating used language and avoiding subjectivity, by finding an 
intersubjective interpretation.
In linguistics, concepts represent meaning and are thus one class of 
words. In general speech, and in historiography, ‘concepti has been used 
interchangeably as a synonym for tidea% ‘term*, ‘thought* or ‘notion*. In history 
of concepts, however, ‘concept* has been defined as ‘the meaning of a term*. 
This distinguishes history of concept firom much of history of ideas. This 
definition makes ‘concept* a modern phenomenon. Concepts are distinguished 
from fixed ideas that can be found earlier in philosophy. Conceptualisation of 
terms is a process that, according to KoseUeck, took place from the 
Enlightenment onwards. ‘To possess a concept*, Skinner writes, ‘is at least 
standardly to understand the meaning of a corresponding term (and to be able 
in consequence to think about the concept when instances are absent and 
recognise it when instances are present)*.'*  ^The most important property of a 
concept is its adaptabihty. Concepts are not a fixed relationship between 
signifier and signified. The semiotic relationship between a symbol and a 
meaning can change, but it can still pertain to the same concept, making it 
possible to investigate a conceptual change. A concept is always a word or a 
phrase — it needs to be represented by something — but a word or a phrase is 
not necessarily a concept. Conceptual history is interested in the fact that 
concepts are not only ambiguous, but also change the variety of meanings it 
can have according to context, especially through time. Given theit 
indistinctness and the dependency on context, concepts wiH always be full of
42 Skinner, Quentin; Visions o f Politics, Volume 1: Regarding Method (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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tension. Both the historical background and our present surroundings must be 
seen as contexts, and because a concept is likely to have different meanings in 
these two contexts, finding a plausible interpretation of both is the first barrier 
for the historian.
Concepts can usually be found in a dichotomous relationship with each 
other, because their ambiguous nature makes it easier to define them by what 
they are not, or rather what they are in contrast to. ‘Counterconcepts* is thus a 
term used by KoseUeck to define two concepts that define themselves by how 
they correlate to each other. This correlation is one . of power, as 
counterconcepts usually describe a ‘them-and-us* or ‘superior/inferior’- 
rektionship. As a power structure, KoseUeck often caUs them asymmetric 
counterconcepts. These concepts are a negation of each other and KoseUeck*s 
reason for this is that a ‘poUtical or social agency is first constituted through 
concepts by means of which it circumscribes itself and hence excludes others; 
and therefore, by means of which it defines i t s e l fE s sen t ia l  concepts 
(Gmndbegriffe) are asymmetric counterconcepts because they can be viewed 
from different angles and thus acquire different meaning. Here KoseUeck uses 
the example of employer/employee in contrast to suppressor/skve. 
Counterconcepts can thus be indicators o f hidden rektionships. This makes 
history of concepts a liberating discipline, rendering it possible to uncover 
hidden power structures through the use o f counterconcepts. This is clearly 
visible in the ‘them-and-us*-rektionship that can be found in investigation of 
‘ckss*, or Foucault the normal and ‘The Other*. Moreover, this can also be 
seen in the dichotomy that Simone de Beauvoir finds in the rektionship 
between ‘man* and ‘woman*.
EngUsh-speaking historians have not been united in the use of 
‘concepf as the unifying term for histories of concepts. This might be one of 
the reasons why not aU history of concepts has been recognised as such. In 
contrast, the German school of Begriffsgeschtchte was clear in its methodology 
and vocabulary and is therefore easUy recognizable as a school of thought. In 
English — and in Norwegkn — ‘category* is often used mstead of and as a
43 KoseUeck, Reinhart; Futures Past. On the Semantics of Historical Time transi. Keith Tribe 
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synonym for ‘concept*. Two examples ate Judith Buder*s analysis of the 
‘category of women* and Jonathan Clark*s ‘category of revolution*. Both 
concepts and categories carry ambiguity and are attempts to classify. ErUng 
Sandmo has highlighted this problem and writes that he — in Norwegian — 
uses ‘category* and ‘concepts* as synonyms and thus sees the construction of 
the category ‘violence* as the synonym to the creation of the concept 
‘violence*.^ Categories are perhaps potential concepts, ‘Women* is an example 
of a category that has gone through a conceptualisation process from the 1960s 
and can possibly be seen as a concept now. In addition, there are other 
concepts which are also used to denote concepts: ‘construction’, ‘phenomena* 
and ‘idea*.'^  ^There seems to be little consistency in the use of ‘concept* and 
related terms in English and there ought to be a clarification. However, as 
these terms denote the same concept — ‘concept* — these discussions are all 
histories of concepts.
The conceptual historical methodology
‘History o f concepts* can be defined by certain characteristics. First, the 
historian writing htetory o f concepts must be aware of Saussure’s distinction 
between signifier and signified and thus also aware of the understanding that 
concepts are signifiers and not what is signified. Concepts are therefore an 
important carrier of meaning, and can thus be a bridge between the past and 
historical understanding. Secondly, because concepts are ambiguous and 
depend on the context in which they are used, the history of concept needs to 
attempt both diachronic and synchronic analysis. Diachronic analysis is 
important to see how the concept has developed in a shifting historical 
environment and a synchronic analysis is important to understand its authentic 
use and meaning. Thirdly, the nature of the history of concepts involves much 
more philosophical awareness than traditional historiography. This is because 
of the ambiguous nature of concepts which forces the historian to take 
decisions about his own interpretation o f the concept in his contemporary
44 ‘A  general and abstract category o f  action will by necessity be a concept, in  the same way as 
an elem ent in a state’s ideological edification with difficulty can be seen as anything but a 
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context and to be aware o f this in the hermeneutical pursuit for past meanings 
of this concept. The first characteristic is defining history of concepts’ as 
‘history of meaning’ and is thus pointing out the uniqueness of this approach 
in comparison with other historical disciplines. Conceptual history is fully 
interpretative, with no aims at explanation. The second point is showing the 
systematic methodology which makes this a scientific academic discipline. 
‘History of concepts’ does not try to be Hterary or purely philosophical, but try 
to keep history as a serious academic discipline, and can thus be seen as being a 
post-modern historical approach that cannot be targeted by Keith 
Windschuttle’s The Killing of The third aspect makes history of
concepts critical and usefid.
It is also possible to make use of the method firom history of concepts 
when writing about historiography. It is possible to follow, both diachronicaUy 
and synchronically, ‘history of concept’ and to be critical of it. As the concept 
has different names, it is necessary to conceptualise this concept Writing about 
theories, this dissertation will also try to incorporate these theories, by 
conceptualizing the histories o f concepts. The synchronic view constitutes the 
major part of this dissertation, but there are attempts to compare histories of 
concepts with histories o f ideas and earlier conceptual history; finding the 
roots of this concept and phenomenon. It would also be impossible to write 
about the history o f concepts if one did not put it, if only vaguely, in a 
theoretical and linguistical context. Having a conceptual methodical point of 
view when writing historiography makes it possible to be critical o f past and 
one’s own methods without undertnining them. Post-linguistic turn writing of 
history and historiography must include a theorizing one’s own condition of 
possibility.
Histories of concepts are a linguistic contextual historical approach. 
There are three things that are important in linguistic contextual history. First, 
there is the Saussurean relationship connecting signifier and signified as this 
relationship is the link between meaning and use and hence also language and 
the past. All historians of concepts have this as their main focus because
45 Windschutde, Keith; The Killing o/H isto^ . Hon/ literary Critics and Social Theorists are Murdering 
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concepts are the relationship between signifier and signified. The meaning of 
the concept is founded on the discourse in which they find themselves. In 
other words, concepts are relative to context. Secondly, concepts are powerful 
as creators of society and culture. The linguistic turn brought the belief that 
language is responsible for how we perceive the world to such an extent that it 
actually helps us create it. As a consequence of this, an analysis of concepts wiU 
be able to tell about the context surrounding it. In other words, the context is 
relative to concepts. The third point is related more indirectly to concepts: The 
experience of the past was dependent on the context and can thus be found in 
the discourses created by the concepts. How the world is perceived and how it 
is experienced are closely linked. With linguistic epistemology all perception is 
coloured by language. O f course this can be seen as a barrier, but it is also a 
great opportunity for the historian who then is able, through an analysis of 
language, to try to interpret the experience of the past.
Histories of concepts are critical disciplines. As the linguistic turn has 
shown us that language has power and the power structures can be uncovered 
by discourse analysis and conceptual inquiry. Foucault claims that a linguistic 
analysis will get us closer to an understanding of the past. Foucault gives 
language the power to control knowledge as the discourse is seen as the limit 
of that which it is possible to have knowledge. The discourse defines the 
system within which words can be structured. Chignok writes that 
Bepiffsgeschichte is a history of concepts that ‘rather aims at its critique and 
deconstmctioti f  and by this he wants to emphasise that Be^ffsgeschichte is an 
active strategy of uncovering linguistic power rektions. The linguistic turn has 
thus made historiogtaphy into a more critical discipline, and this must be taken 
as a critique against the view that historiography has become less scientific.
4"^ Chignola, p.535
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Part II
Histories of concepts
31
2  Socio-political concept in p o litica l history
No event can be narrated, no structure represented, no process described without the use of 
historical concepts which make the past ^^ conceivable,
Historians who have dejfined themselves as conceptual historians have 
always worked on political and social concepts. This can thus be seen as the 
established history of concept. A reason for this is that Begrÿsgeschichte and 
KoseUeck have been considered an inspiration for many historians of concepts 
and this school has focused on political concepts and their relation to society. 
Despite Begriffsgeschichte being the leading school of conceptual history, there are 
stiU linguistic approaches to political history that can be classified as histories 
of concepts without having been motivated by this school. Another reason is 
that inteUectual history has, especially in Britain, been interested in political 
theory and political concepts. In addition, historians working on political 
theory and language have found conceptual analysis helpful. The history of 
political theory was quick to adopt a linguistic focus because it was useful in 
acquiring greater understanding. The linguistic turn in historiogtaphy did 
therefore not come as a shock to this discipline. Terence BaU writes at the 
beginning of hb book Tranfbrming Political Discourse: Political Theo^ and Critical 
Conceptual History that he feels conceptual history is a discipline that stretches 
far back:
In a sense my subject is as old o f  the biblical story o f  Babel. It is addressed 
also in Thucydides’ account o f  the revolution at Corcyra during which  
Svords changed their meaning’, in H obbes’ chilling description o f  die state 
o f  nature, and in  V ico’s account o f  the linguistic origins and evolution o f  
the old world o f  nations.^^
4® KoseUeck (1985), p. 112
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As can be seen ficom the examples o f the historians with whom Ball compares 
himself, history of concepts is actually the history of political concepts It is 
however, most natural to have some hesitation with regards to this earlier 
history of concepts as being true to the definition of conceptual methodology. 
They can instead be seen as histories of political ideas that grasp some 
conceptual changes happening at the time investigated.
German Geist and social history
German historiography has traditionally valued ideas and 
Begriffsgeschichte must be seen in this tradition. Ideas, spirit and the essence of 
history have occupied historical writing in Germany more than they have in 
Britain. Before the 1960s school o f Begriffsgeschichte there had also been 
historians who defined their work as conceptual history in the genre o f history 
of ideas, but this was inspired by Hegelian philosophy and ‘concepts’ was 
merely a substitute for ‘ideas’. This approach has none of the litiguistic 
awareness we find m histories of concepts as defined in this dissertation. 
Geistesgeschichte had traditionally a strong Platonic element and Germany 
thought believed in ideas and their organic development. Although histories of 
concepts grew out of this tradition, it was in opposition to this way of thinking. 
This new group of conceptual historians stated that there are no such things as 
fixed ideas; concepts are developing with society and they are therefore as 
much influenced by society as they influence society themselves.
Social history was central in German historiography both before and 
after the Second World War.^ ® Wemer Conze is usually credited with usually 
gets the credit for the establishment of social history in German universities 
after 1945. His method is of a different character ftom the French Annales as 
his social history gave a prominent place to both politics and history of 
concepts.®  ^His thoughts are combined with Koselleck’s as the comer stones of 
Begriffsgeschichte emphasizing the link between politics, society and language. 
KoseUeck sums this up in this way;
50 After Karl Lamprecht’s Deutsche Geschichte (1891) a debate on social history started in 
Germany and later social history was used as to try to explain the Weimar Republic. See Iggers, 
pp. 31-2 and 65-70
5^  Richter, Melvin; The History of Political and Social Concepts. A. Critical Introduction (Oxford and
New York: Oxford University Press 1995), p.31
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There is no history w ithout societal formations and the concepts by which  
they define and seek to m eet there challenges, whether reflexively or self- 
reflexively; without them, it is impossible to experience and to interpret 
history, to represent or to recount it. In this sense, society and language 
belong to  the metahistorical premises w ithout which Geschichte and Historié 
are unthinkable. Social-historical and conceptual-historical theories, 
questions, and methods thus refer to  all possible areas within the discipline
o f  history, 52
German social history never rejects politics and I’histoire événetnentiélîe. Compared 
with the AnnaleSy the German social historical approach is interdisciplinary 
towards politics and language, while the French are interdisciplinary towards 
geography, geology and anthropology.
Otto Brunner, Wemer Conze and Reinhart KoseUeck, the editors of 
Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, are the founding fathers of Begriffsgeschichte in 
Germany. They are aU educated in the German historicist tradition with strong 
links to traditional German history of ideas. The project is thus a fusion of 
historicism with the new approaches of social history and linguistic awareness. 
Even though the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe-pto)G.ct is politically opposed to old 
traditional Geistesgeschichte, as it might have been a reason for the German 
mentality that developed the National Social regune, the linguistic emphasis in 
Begriffsgeschichte resembles German phenomenological philosophy, more than 
Anglo-American analytical philosophy. Brunner saw conceptual history to be 
necessary for ‘rescuing historicism from the liberal and national anachronisms 
that had distorted it.’^  ^ A reconstruction o f the past’s conceptual universe 
would make the study o f the past possible. Conze was know as a theorist and 
was influential in developing methodology for German social history — 
structural history — and Begriffsgeschichte^ ’'^
52 KoseUeck, Reinhart; The Practice o f Conceptual History. TimingHistory, Spacing Concepts (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press 2002), pp.22-3 
Melton, James van Horn; ‘From Folk History to Structural History. Otto Brunner (1898- 
1982) and the Radical-Conservative Roots o f  German Social H isto r / in Paths o f Continuity. 
Central European Historiog-aphj/ from the 1930s to the 1950s eds. H. Lehmann and J v  H  Melton 
(Washington, DC: Cambridge University P ress/ German Historical Institute, 1994), p.278 
Veit-Brause, IrmUne; ‘W emer Conze (1910-1986): The Measure o f  History and the 
Historian’s Measures’ in  Paths o f continuity: Central European historio^aphy from the 1930*s through the 
1950’s ed. Hartmut Lehman and James Van Horn M elton (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), p.308
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In Britain thete ate two diffetent varieties of historical interest in socio­
political concepts; one based on history of political ideas and one based on 
social history turned linguisricaL As m Germany, political ideas had been a 
traditional historical study in Britain. This tradition has even been stronger in 
Britain because the study o f political theory has been as much a historical 
study. This tradition has stressed the individual agency rather than a collective 
Geist and this has made the study of political concepts less metaphysical. 
Concepts are not accredited with the same power here as in the German 
tradition. In British social history it is mainly the concept of ‘class’ that has 
received a linguistic, post-structuralistic investigation and these analyses wiU be 
looked at later in this chapter. The interest in class sprang out ftom an interest 
in identity and class-consciousness more than a genuine linguistic interest. A 
conceptual investigation was a tool rather than a new understanding. One 
example of this is Eric Hobsbawm’s foreword to John Foster’s Class Struggle 
and the Industrial devolution where he writes that this book
deals both with important conceptual questions (such as the nature o f  ‘class 
consciousness” and ‘false consciousness”) with every fundamental 
problems o f  structure o f  society (such as the nature o f  the relationship 
between antagonistic classes and social control), and with crucial questions 
o f  nineteenth-century history, arising out o f  the author’s major theme, ‘ the 
development and decline o f  a revolutionary class consciousness’ in the 
second quarter o f  the century’.55
In anglophone literature this is often seen as part of linguistic historiography, 
but as Hobsbawm writes this is more about the class-consciousness where the 
concept of ‘class’ is a tool both for creating and investigating class- 
consciousness.
Histories of political society
KoseUeck believes there is a strong connection between social history 
and Begrffsgeschichte. His argument is that social history is dependent on 
concepts and conceptual history is dependent on a social context.^^ However, 
this article has not had a great impact on the broadening of an interest for
55 Hobsbawm, Eric; ‘Foreword’ in John Foster; Class Struggk and the Industrial Revolution. Early 
Industrial Capitalism in Three English Towns (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1974), pp.xii-xiii 
55 See in particular KoseUeck (1982)
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social concepts amongst the historians that normally would define themselves 
as conceptual historians. For KoseUeck it is very important to state the 
relationship between social history and Begriffsgeschichte. He claims that they 
have different speeds of transformation and are based on different structures, 
but they are therefore dependent on each other;
the academic terminology o f  social history remains dependent on the 
history o f  concepts, so as to  access linguistically stored experience. A nd  
equally, conceptual history remains dependent on the result o f  social 
history, so  as to keep in view  the difference between vanished reality and 
its linguistic evidence, which can never be bridged.^?
However, KoseUeck always emphasises the importance of Begriffsgeschichte, Even 
though it is society and social constellations that interest conceptual historians, 
they have theit interest founded in linguistics and have an anti-materialistic 
attitude to history. Social history can thus never become as important as 
Begriffsgeschichte because this is an idealbtic historical view, basing history on 
thought However, there seems to be the impression of James Schmidt that the 
project of Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe has ended up being too theoretical and can 
only work as a guideline o f what Begrffsgeschichte should be Uke.^ ^
Quentin Skinner writes that ‘if we wish to write [history of conceptual 
change] it seems to me rather that we shaU do weU to concentrate in particular 
on the concepts we employ to describe and appraise what Hobbes caUed our 
artificial world, the world o f politics and m ora lity .T h is  coincides also with 
his field of interests and he has been considered a historian of concepts. 
However, Skinner would not like to be compared to the work of KoseUeck, as 
he does not see their methodology to be the same. This is, however, an 
argument for the possibilities o f more than one history of concept. Skinner’s 
utterance should therefore been taken to mean that he prefers history of 
poUtical concepts to other histories of concepts.
Skinner and KoseUeck have different methodologies, so if they are to 
be taken as representatives of the British and the German approach 
respectively, one must argue that poUtical history of concepts in Britain and
57 KoseUeck, (2002), p.37
5® Schmidt, James; ‘H ow  historical is Be^ffs^schichteP in  History o f European Ideas 25 (1999) p .l4  
59 Skiimer, (2002), p .l7 5
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Germany both have different philosophical backgrounds and developed 
different methodologies. The political society plays different parts in Skinner’s 
and Koselleck’s methodologies. For Skinner, the political society is a stage 
where the political actor can try out his utterances. KoseUeck, on the other 
hand, sees the poUtical society as something that is created by the language we 
aU use. The individual is needed in Skinner’s argument as the driving force of 
change. In KoseUeck’s methodology, change is something that is created by the 
linguistic discourse. Conceptual change and conceptual analysis in Britain and 
Germany have become different because of this. A Skinnerian conceptual 
analysis wiU find the roots of the conceptual change to be a poUtical actor, 
whUst a KoseUeckian conceptual analysis wiU give a historical explanation for 
the linguistic changes that influenced poUtical and societal changes.
The relationship between concepts, poUtics and society has not only 
occupied those defining themselves as historians of concepts. Conceptual 
history has been occupied with some of the same problems as sociology. Max 
Weber can possibly be seen as one of the fathers of modem sociology and his 
works on the German Biirgerslichkeit have definitively shaped the work of 
Habermas and KoseUeck who both have written on the same topic.^  ^ For 
Weber, the emphasis was on material history, whilst KoseUeck and Habermas 
draw more attention to concepts and mentaUties respectively. Sociology is a 
related discipline that also was influeticed by the linguistic turn, but Weber is 
too early to have been influenced by linguistics. However, his work can be seen 
to be contextuaUst and might have influenced discourse analysis ficom another 
angle than Unguistics. As sociology and Begrffsgeschkhte share there interest for 
society in modernity, it would not be surprising if their post-linguistic turn 
methodologies should have something in common.
Conceptual history and the linguistic turn
German Begriffsgeschichte beUeves that language presupposes language 
and society. Since KoseUeck beUeves that history presupposes society and
55 Habeitnas, Jürgen; The Structural Transformation o f the Public Sphere. A n  Inquiry into a Category of 
Bourgeois Sodety (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 1991) and KoseUeck, Reinhart; ‘Three 
hiirgertiche Worlds? Preliminary Theoretical-Historical Rerriarks on the Comparative Semantics 
o f  Civil Society in Germany, England and France’ \sxThe Practice o f Conceptual History. Timing 
History, Spacing Concepts (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2002), pp.208-217
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language and thus sees them as the foundation of society, it is easy to define 
him as a linguistic social historian. Language collects experience and at the 
same time predicts the experiences that wUl come by categorizing them in 
linguistic contexts that exist before the experiences themselves. Language has 
the ability to absorb the knowledge, the structures of action and the challenges 
that is the historical situation.
KoseUeck beUeves that history presupposes language and society.
Begriffsgeschichte was mainly a German phenomenon until the 
development of the History o f PoUtical and Social Concepts Group. Even 
though Skinner was writing history of concepts before he knew about 
Begfffsgeschichte, it is stUl the methodology developed in Germany that goes 
under the terminology of conceptual history. It seem that the only reason why 
there was Utde talk of conceptual history in anglophone historiography before 
this was the non-iaterest in reading outside one’s own circle. Begriffsgeschichte 
was its own school, with supporters among those who read German, but Uttle 
interest from others. Melvin Richter took the job of introduciag conceptual 
history to Anglophone readers; first in articles in the 1980, but espedaUy in his 
book The Histoiy of Social and Political Concepts (1995).*^  ^By the mid-1990s more 
historians, on both sides o f the Atlantic, had learned about German conceptual 
history. Begrffsgeschichte then became the accepted way of examining history of 
concepts and other attempts were not categorised as history of concepts. This 
developed further to an international interest in conceptual history. 
Begriffsgeschichte must be seen as the inspiration o f The History of Political and Social 
Concepts Group (HPSCG). The HPSCG was founded in 1998, and it unites 
historians o f different periods and nationaUries to get together on 
methodological grounds.'^^ The conferences held by the HPSCG have 
nevertheless been less dogmatic in its methodology. Historians have 
participated with papers based on different conceptual approaches and have 
not been limited by the modernity timeftame characteristic of Begriffsgeschichte.
51 Richter (1995)
52 Programmatic statement signed at the founding m eeting 18 June 1998 at the Finnish 
Instimte in London,
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Essential political concepts
Essential political concepts are, according to the Begriffsgeschichte 
historians, concepts that are essential for the construction of society. They are 
metaphysical entities that not only describe society, but which also are a force 
in the creation process of societal structures. The essential concepts are part of 
the political discourse that builds society. This is the link between society, 
politics and language. Iggers translates Grundbegrffe as *basic historic concept’. 
However, using the term ‘essential concept’ the relation to linguistic 
understanding becomes clearer than the reference to concepts as basic or fixed 
ideas. Two essential concepts that have proved to be more essential than 
others are ‘revolution’ and ‘class’. The first mainly in relation to political history 
and the latter to social history but the division between social and political 
history is vague in conceptual history.
devolution*
‘Revolution’ is a concept that has been investigated by many because it 
seems to be essential in political explanations. Historians of political concepts 
have found this an important indicator of the change towards modernity. 
‘Revolution’ is a concept investi^ted both by KoseUeck, both in Critique and 
Crisis and in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, and early modem historians as Skinner 
and Pocock. Terence BaU writes that
‘revolution’ [did not] mean for Locke and his contemporaries what it 
means for us. They understood a revolution to be a coming fuU circle, a 
restoration o f  som e earlier uncormpted condition; w e understand it to  be 
the collective overthrow o f  an old regime and the creation o f  an entirely 
new  one. 53
Since a conceptual analysis is looking both at terms and at meaning, it is rather 
an advantage to the historians working on periods before the French 
Revolution. This is necessary research for the understanding of the roots of 
concepts. Although Skinner and Pocock are interested in early modern political 
concepts, most historians of political concepts work on the period of change 
into modernity. This is due to a shared belief that there has been a
53 Ball, p .l 6
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conceptualisation process in modem times. This also makes a division between 
those founding their history o f concepts on Begriffsgeschichte and those coming 
from a different school of thought. Conceptualisation of terms is a process 
that, according to KoseUeck, took place firom the Enlightenment onwards. It 
was with the French Revolution, above aU, that terms and concepts started 
changing meaning and concepts became active.
The French Revolution is seen as one of the main events o f modem 
history; the event that makes modern society. As Richter also points out the 
French Revolution is considered a turning point when many concepts changed 
meaning or were invented, it is obviously supposed to be characteristic for the 
history of political and social ideas. '^  ^There is both continuity and discontinuity 
in history and those founded in Begriffsgeschichte believe the French Revolution is 
a point of discontinuity. However, as aU history of conceptual change needs 
both a diachronic and a synchronic analysis, roots of the concepts earlier than 
a late eighteenth century are also investigated.
As the French Revolution is considered such an important event in 
history o f political concepts, it is possible to ask if conceptual history is 
possible m the pre-modem period, and if Skinner and Pocock thus can be 
historians o f concepts. It seems that the Begriffsgeschichte supporters believe the 
discontinuity of concepts though the French Revolution makes earlier 
conceptual analysis impossible. However, these historians have shown that it is 
possible to use the same conceptual methodology with success. Furthermore, it 
is not so that these early modem historians are not aware of the 
conceptualisation process. Pocock writes about the conceptualisation of time 
and which impacts that has on historical understanding,*’^  Concepts are a 
phenomenon of modem time. When Hans-Jürgen Lüsebrink analyses the 
concept ‘nation’ in revolutionary France and Germany, he points out that ‘[t]he 
genesis of a conception of a national identity followed as a result of the French 
Revolution and the war o f liberation’.*^*^
54 Richter (1995), p.89
55 Pocock, p.39
55 Lüsebrink, Hans-Jürgen; ‘Conceptual History and Conceptual Transfer: the Case o f  ‘N ation’ 
in Revolutionary France and G erm an/ in H istoy o f Concepts: Comparative Perspectives eds. Iain 
Hampsher-Monk, Karin Tilmans and Frank van Vree (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University 
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However, the focus on the French Revolution ftom a linguistic point 
of view did not suit everybody. Lynn Hunt is also interested in the linguistic 
impact of ‘revolution’, but she claims that the politics is more important than 
the concept:
In the heat o f  debate and poEdcal conflict, the very notion o f  "the 
political” expanded and changed shape. The structure o f  the polity changed 
under the impact o f  increasing political participation and popular 
mobilization; political language, political ritual, and political organization all 
took on  new  forms and meanings. [ ...]  N either politics nor the concept o f  
the political was invented by the French, but, for reasons that are still not 
well understood, the French managed to invest them with extraordinary 
emotional and symbolic significance.
So even if some people working with social concepts would be supporters of a 
linguistic episteme, this is not necessarily the general trend. Hunt argues that 
politics are ‘an instrument for refashioning society’.*^* Even though KoseUeck 
never would dismiss politics totaUy as important for social change it is the 
interrelationship between language, society and politics that makes 
development., and Hunt is not aware of this.
Political history has not become unfashionable after the linguistic turn 
and Jonathan Clark is a historian who has recently became interested in the 
concept of ‘revolution’. He has produced a conceptual analysis o f ‘revolution’ 
based on twentieth-century historiography. His results are nevertheless quite 
similar to Koselleck’s. Clark argues that since the concept ‘revolution’ has 
changed it has thus been important for historical wtiting.*^  ^However, it should 
be brought to mind that not aU historians are of this persuasion.
‘Class’ is an important concept because class discussion has been a 
central phenomenon in modern society. The vocabulary surrounding ‘class’ has 
been influenced by Marxist historiography and though Marxist historiography 
would disagree on the importance o f concepts, being part of the
57 Hunt, Lynn; Politics, Culture, Class in the French Revolution (London; Methuen, 1986), pp.2-3 
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superstructure, ‘class’ has been thoroughly investigated. ‘Class’ has thus been 
looked at ftom many different historical approaches.
When Raymond Williams writes in his Keymrds ‘Class is an obviously 
difficult word, both in its range of meanings and in its complexity in that 
particular meaning where it describes a social division’,^ *^ he is obviously more 
concerned about the term than the meaning. Keywords is close to an 
etymological dictionary as he follows the use of terms through history. It is 
interesting to note that in his entry on ‘class’, he is concerned with its 
ambiguity. However, looking at the other entries, ‘class’ is unique in its 
conceptual treatment. Nevertheless, it is ‘class’ and how this term is used about 
the concept ‘working class’ that occupies most of Williams’ entry. He mention 
that ‘class’ can refer to ‘group’, ‘rank’ and ‘formation’.^  ^ Skinner is sceptical 
about Williams’ project and writes:
Williams appears, in short, to  have overlooked the strongly holistic 
implications o f  the fact that, when a word changes meaning, it alters its 
relationship with an entire vocabulary. What this tells us about such 
changes is that w e m ust be prepared to focus not on the ‘normal structure’ 
o f  particular words, but rather on  their role in upholding complete social 
philosophies.72
It is natural to compare ‘keywords’ with Geschichtliche Grundbe^iffe’s ‘essential 
concepts’. The idea behind these projects seem to be similar, namely to 
investigate the relationship between a core political vocabulary and society, but 
Williams’ ‘keywords’ are terms, while ‘essential concepts’ are meaning. This 
makes the German inquiry deeper, and it is perhaps thus more likely to find the 
underlying layers of that which constructs society. Wüliams claims he is doing a 
semantic investigation, and he does, even though he does not have the same 
conceptual analysis as the historians of concept. It must be mentioned that 
Williams does not seem to be aware o f the project of Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe 
even though Keywords was published in 1976. It would have been natural to 
include Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe both when he discusses the project of Oxford
70 Williams, Raymond; Keywords. A  Vocabulary of Culture and Society (London; Fontana/Croom  
Helm, 1976), p.51 
7iib id .,p .59  
72 Skinner, (2002), p. 165
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English Dictionay and also in his bibliography, but Williams started his project 
much earlier.
E.P. Thompson was an important inspiration for a new focus. This 
new focus is on class-consciousness rather than linguistics. The importance is 
that he centres on ‘class’ as something socially constructed. The linguistic turn 
had not influenced historiography to any relevant extent when The Making of the 
English Working Ohnr was first published in 1963. Thompson writes:
By class I understand a historical phenom enon, unifying a number o f  
disparate and seemingly unconnected events, both in the raw material and 
experience and in consciousness. I emphasize that it is a historical 
phenom enon. I do not see class as a ‘structure’, nor even as a ‘categor/, 
but as som ething which in fact happens (and can be shown to have 
happened) in human relationships.^^
W4ien Thompson writes that class is a '^'historical phenomenon” it seems to be a 
clear indication of the fact that he has a materialistic rather than a linguistic 
approach to history. In comparison to Thompson Williams is open about his 
linguistic interests writing that ‘we are coming increasingly to realise that our 
vocabulary [...] is no second factor, but a practical and radical element in itself. 
To take a meaning from experience, and to try to make it active, is in fact our 
process of gtowth.’^"*^ Wüliams is also a literary historian and looks at different 
sorts of texts than Thompson and might therefore feel that a linguistic 
approach is more natural.
Joan Scott is one linguistic historian who has found Thompson 
linguistically interesting. Even though Thompson does not have the sufficient 
linguistic vocabulary his research could still be of interest for others’ work on 
the concept of ‘class’. Scott has noticed this:
Positioning him self as the carrier o f  historical memory, Thom pson  
briUiandy captured the terms o f  working-class discourse. H e did so by using 
concepts o f  class that had been formulated by the nineteenth-century 
movem ent and used in  the twentieth century. The Making o f the English 
Working Class endorsed and reproduced a particular concept o f  class. As 
such, it can be read as a double historical document: it gathers rich evidence 
about how  class became understood in the past and it incorporates those 
meanings in its ow n construction o f  working-class history. Analyzing the 
contents and the textual strategies o f  The making of the English Working Class
73 Thom pson, E.P.; The M aking of the English Working Class (London: Gollancz, 1963), p .8
74 Williams, Raymond; Culture and Society 1780-1950 (London: Chatto & W indus,1967), p .338
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thus gives insight into the historical operations o f  a particular idea o f  
working class. 7®
This means working on Thompson as a source for the conceptual 
development of ‘class’, and seems to have possibilities as an interesting study. 
However, historians still seem to be preoccupied in debating with him rather 
than analysing his vocabulary; except from Gareth Stedman Jones who praises 
Thompson for having ‘freed the concept of class consciousness from any 
simple reduction to the development o f productive which cannot be 
reduced to the terminology of incoherent protest.
As mentioned earlier, poststructuralist historians found an interest in 
the linguistic creation of class. Patrick Joyce is on poststructuralist historian 
who answers Thompson. Poststructuralist historical writing was inspired by 
Saussure’s analysis of language in the form of langue. The linguistic structures 
are enough for historical understanding. People do not experience their Efe or 
the past as linguistic structures. Experience is therefore included as a 
foundation and the linguistic structure as a tool. Joyce’s main purpose has been 
to show that classical workers’ history has taken many things for granted. He 
has especially looked into class identity as treated by E. P. Thompson in his 
classic The Making of the English Working Class, which it must be possible to call 
a structuralist approach to historical writing. Thompson is mostly interested in 
economic and social structures as constructing history, but he also emphasises 
language as a contributing factor. Thompson writes about class-consciousness 
as a phenomenon of the nineteenth century; not only the division of classes, 
but also the identity and vocabulary constructing it. Joyce in his works Visions 
of the People and Democratic Subjects ^  argues that ‘class’ and class-consciousness 
are constructed phenomena of the twentieth century. The working class have
75 Scott, Joan Wallach; Gender and the Politics o fH istoy  (N ew  York: Columbia University Press, 
1988), p.71 She claims he really have a understanding o f  the concept ‘class’ and she refers to 
this quote ftom  The M aking o f the English Working Class: ‘‘Class is defined by men as they live 
their own history, and in the end, this is its only definition.” [Thompson, The M aking o f the 
English Working Class, p. 11] Thus did T hom pson refute the sociologists and politicians who  
reified a historically specific idea.
75 Stedman Jones, Gareth; Lanffcage o f Class. Studies in Working Class H istoy 1832 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983), p . l01
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been constructed because it has been easier to deal with the working 
population of the eighteenth and nineteenth century that way. Joyce’s main 
argument is that the context wiU be experienced differently dependent on the 
identity of the person’s perspective, and therefore an analysis of individuals is 
much more beneficial for the historical understanding than a broader structural 
analysis. Joyce has been criticised for not bringing anything constructively new 
into social history,^* but what he brings into historiography is an interest in new 
sources.
Whilst most research on ‘class’ has been done in relation to the 
working classes, Jürgen Kocka has undertaken a conceptual analysis of ‘class’ 
in relation to the middle classes. Just as KoseUeck has pointed out the different 
conceptual meaning of burger, citoyen and ‘citizen’, Kocka has been token by the 
problem of the middle classes because of the difference between the concepts 
of ‘lower middle class’, Mittelstand and classes moyennes!^  Despite Kocka’s 
awareness of concepts as creators of meaning, identity and society, linguistics 
does not seem to be on his agenda. Iggers describe Kocka as a structuralist 
class historian and Kocka himself mentions interests in economical, social, 
cultural and political aspects.®*’ Kocka’s analysis is mainly on American white- 
collar workers. The concept of this middle class group has been more 
UnguisticaUy analysed by Gunter Barth in his City PeopkT" Where KoseUeck 
accentuates the poUtical discourse as the linguistic creator of society, Barth give 
weight to the discourse of popular culture and especiaUy the press. Barth’s 
argument is constructivist, but he would hardly categorise himself as a 
conceptual historian. Neither Kocka not Barth fails perfectly in to the 
classification of historians o f concepts outlined in the theory chapter, Kocka 
focuses on concepts, but does not seem to be particularly Ung^sticaUy aware; 
however, he has the historical critical attitude looking at how the class identity 
created by different concepts has legitimated different poUtical regimes. Barth,
7® Mayfield, David and Susan Thom ; ’Social history and its discontents; Gareth Stedman Jones 
and the politics o f  language’ in Social History 17 (1992), pp .165-188 
79 Kocka, Jurgen; White Collar Workers in America 1890-1940. A  Socio-Political H istoy in an 
International Perspective (Beverly H ill and London: Sage, 1980), p.6 
Iggers , p.73 and Kocka, p. 15 
®i Barth, Gunther; City People. The Rise o f Modem City Culture in Nineteenth-Centuy America (N ew  
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on the other hand, seems to have the belief in the power of language, but he 
uses language as a tool to understand identity; conceptual change creates 
identity.
Diversity and ongoing activity
Although ‘revolution’ and ‘class’ both have been the subject of 
conceptual analysis, the analyses have been quite different because of the 
historiographical context in which they stand. First of all, ‘revolution’ has 
caught the interest of political theorists, because the study of die concept 
‘revolution’ has the possibility of telling how political thought has changed. On 
the other hand, ‘class’ has caught the attention ftom social historians wanting 
to reach those who are being categorised within classes, especially the working 
classes. Both ‘revolution’ and ‘class’ have an inherent value as a key to previous 
vocabulary and understanding. This is the essence of the history of political 
and social concepts, to reach the thoughts of previous social and political 
discourses through analysis o f conceptual change. It seems that the interest in 
political concepts came first because of the relation to history of political ideas 
both in Britain and in the German school of Begriffsgeschichte. Although 
KoseUeck states a relationship between political concepts and social history, 
social history must be seen as taking the b i^est step when incorporating 
linguistic analysis. Social history does not only work on society, but has also 
looked for causal explanation for social changes. A conceptual approach is 
founded on interpretation, not explanation, and linguistic rather than social 
objects.
Melvin Richter asks for a project like Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe in 
English because he sees how useful such a project has been both for 
researchers and for the general German reader. However, he does not see the 
possibility of such a project because of three objections:
(1) that any such entetprise is fatally flawed by its covert attempt to revive a 
version o f  German idealism long since discredited by English-speaking 
linguists or analytical philosophers; (2) that equivalent conceptual histories 
are available in reference works written in English; (3) that in addition to 
such reference works, those concerned with the history o f  words, terms.
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and concepts in the E n^ ish  language have long possessed a great work, the 
Oxford English DictionaiyP-
These objections explain why such a project has not been carried out in 
English, but they are not good reasons why it should not be carried out. 
Richter continues, in his argument, to explain that a history of political and 
social concepts would provide a more historical approach than what these 
reference works has been able to. The advantages of such a project would, 
according to Richter, ‘well justify the effort’.®^
The interest in die history o f socio-political concepts seems to be 
increasing. This is mainly due to the organisation of the History of Political 
Concepts Group. The interest and the participation at the HPSCG conferences 
show a development of this methodology. So far there has been a variety of 
approaches that has been included at these conferences, but this interest might 
put a focus on the development o f this methodology as a discipline of its own.
82 Richter (1995), p .l44  
83ibid,p-160
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i Concepts and cultural bistoty
Culture as a category of social life has itself been concepttmli^ ed in a number of different
The essence of history of cultural concepts is the study of concepts 
that have been essential to cultural society. Concepts that have influenced how 
the world has been perceived, but which might not have had a direct political 
power. However, the strong interlink between politics, society, culture and 
language has become more and more clear as interdisciplinary historical 
disciplines have developed over the last decades. The relationship between 
culture, history and language is an old one, each of which represents the 
academic disciplines of arts. Culture has, nevertheless, not been investigated 
with conceptual methods until the end o f the twentieth century. There was no 
cidtural historical discipline that could be compared to the history of political 
ideas as a driving force for conceptual history within the cultural smdies. The 
interpretation methods o f cultural history have developed as the focus of 
cultural history has changed Cultural history as we know it today is a new 
discipline which also, has developed alon^ide linguistic historiography from 
the mid-twentieth century. It has been occupied with cultural identity and 
cultural experience in the broad sense, and is very different from Jacob 
Burkhart’s cultural history of the nineteenth century. The twentieth century has 
not brought an end to the study of high culture, but rather extended the 
history o f culture to include all o f human construction.
Textual structures and cultural history
As Begriffsgeschichte and KoseUeck have been sources of inspiration for 
historians of political and social concepts, Foucault has been the inspiration for
84 Sewell, William H.; ‘The Concept(s) o f  Culture’ in Beyond the Cultural Turn eds Victoria E.
Bonnell and Lynn Hunt (Berkley: University o f  California Press, 19.99), p-40
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histQtiaas of cultural concepts. Foucault gave a new perspective on die 
relationship between language power and society, and he was interested in 
cultural interrelations rather than political relations. Within cultural history 
there has been an interest in minority culture as well as popular culture. Many 
of Foucault’s books have been about the mechanism that divide the minority 
culture of thé others ftom the accepted culture, Foucault’s discourse analysis is 
a mild form of textuality. This methodology has therefore been of inspiration 
to historians seeing that culture has to be interpreted as a text. As Foucault is 
interested in power structures, this is an aspect where his methodology can be 
seen to be very useful. Later in this chapter one will see how Foucault has 
influenced the study of Sdolence’ and ‘witchcraft’ — two concepts of interest to 
both cultural and juridical historians as power relations are clearly involved. !
The same methodology could be used for ‘child’ as well. {
Foucault has two different ways of treating concepts. First, he I
investigates concepts that are already under discussion such as ‘man’ and j
‘poweF. The treatment of these concepts can be seen as a methodological |
individualism.®® "Man’ was his interest in the early archaeological period and ,
‘power’ was the interest of genealogy.®*’ Secondly, he invents, or takes an ;
innovative look at, new concepts such as ‘archive’, ‘episteme’ and ‘madness’ — i
iconcepts ftom a vocabulary that develops through the historical ■
conceptualisation process. Foucault does not define concepts, but he writes I
about formation of concepts in The Archaeology of Knowledge. It is clear, however, I
that concepts, as he treats them, are words with a powerful meaning that refer 
to something abstract and thus will change according to context. As Munslow
points out: ‘Foucault goes so far as to suggest that the concept o f the empirical '
fact is nothing more than a naive discourse of nineteenth century science.’®^ He 
thus has a much more sceptical attitude to concepts than Koselleck. Compared 
with Koselleck, Foucault does not believe in the power of concepts. Concepts
are indicators of the mentality of a society rather than the fundamental bricks. •
Patricia O’Brian believes that many post-war social historians shared 
this concern for cultural formation, which Foucault links to linguktics and
85 Flynn, p.39
85 McNay, Lois; Foucault A  Critical Introduction (Cambridge; Polity Press, 1994), p.3 
87 M unslow p. 127
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conceptual formation. This is where she sees the promising potential in his 
work.
Power/knowledge is a fact o f  power/culture. The fragmentation, 
segmentation, "capillarity” o f  the work o f  contemporary post-Marxist 
cultural historians — those w ho study w om en, villages, courts, families, 
prisons, adultery, odors, epidemics, the welfare state, and the like — can 
be accommodated in his universe, in w hich technologies o f  power are 
rooted in  multiple serial institutions, in w hich technologies o f  power are 
rooted in multiple serial institutions, in which subjects, sex, individuals, 
the soul. Western culture itself are viewed through ruptures in 
discourses.’®*
It is in this way that cultural historians have been interested in concepts and a 
linguistic perspective. O ’Brian notices that cultural history becomes interested 
in these cultural concepts because of Foucault’s methodology of discourse 
analysis. However, she seems to fail to see the relationship between a 
conceptual analysis and the discourse. Her remarks are possibly representative 
of what social historians have noticed and similarly it is fair to say that Foucault 
did not have any direct influence on social history and its treatment of 
concepts. Nevertheless, he has been an indirect influence creating a discourse 
where it is seen as beneficial to talk about concepts, discourse and power also 
in cultural and social history.
Cultural history developed differently ftom the history of socio-political 
concepts. The shift firom history o f political ideas to the history of political and 
social concepts was a natural development when linguistics developed 
conceptual understanding. Cultural history, however, should be seen 
differently. Even though disciplines such as history of art, theatre and literature 
have been studied for centuries and to some extent must be seen as cultural 
history, something else that implied by the term ‘cultural history’. Cultural 
history is a discipline that developed firom the mid-twentieth century in parallel 
to history of concepts, and focuses on all forms of culture, using 
anthropological methodology through time instead of space. Just as 
anthropology embraced structuralism and textuality after the linguistic turn, 
cultural history was the historical discipline which welcomed textuality most.
®* O’Brian, Patricia; ‘Foucault’s History o f  Culture’ in The New CulturalHistoty ed. Lynn Hunt
(Berkley: University o f  California Press, 1989), pp.437,4
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Aletta Biersack has noticed how history and anthropology developed during 
this time of change that
all roads appear to co u v er^  on  literary theory. The shift from “social 
history” (inspired, in part, by anthropology) to  a concern with historical 
texts and their literary properties — associated with the work o f  D om inick  
LaCapra and Hayden W hite [...]  — is paralleled in anthropology by a shift in 
focus from culture-as-text (interpretation’s muse) to  anthropological texts 
(ethnographies) and their rhetorical strategies.
Textualist historiogtaphy — and anthropology — emphasise interptetation 
instead of explanation and is thus well suited for history of concepts. Richard 
Biernacki has perhaps gone too far into die textualist analysis: TSut grasping 
culture as an ontolo^cal ground enables the new cultural historians to combine 
this formally ironic stance with a reliance on synecdoche inside their own 
scholarly game.’^ *^ The question is then if cultural historians are interested in 
cultural concepts to understand past societies.
The twentieth century saw the rise o f several new historical disciplines. 
Cultural history had been written at least since the nineteenth century, but the 
form that developed from the mid-twentieth century was of a different kind. 
Just as intellectual history had turned from the works of great men to mentalité, 
cultural history now approaches the culture o f the people not only the high 
culture of the elite. The writing of microhistory is generally described in the 
collective term of New Cultural History. However, the cultural history that is 
in any way related to concepts, is the cultural history that is similar to rhistoire 
des mentalités. Different disciplines within history differentiate from each other 
not only in what they study as much as they differ in how they study. It will 
always be important for a new discipline to make its methodological claims 
clear. Cultural historians tried many of the historical theories which were 
present in mid-twentieth-century academic discussions, amongst them 
different linguistic theories. Unfortunately for history of concepts, it was 
semiotics rather than semantics that interested the cultural historians. Semiotics
Bietsack, Aletta; ‘Local Knowledge, Local History: Geertz and Beyond’ in The Nen> Cultural 
H istoiy ed. Lynn Hunt (Berkley; University o f  California Press, 1989), p.73 
Biernacki, Richard; ‘Method and Metaphor after the N ew  Cultural H istory in Beyond the 
Cultural Turn eds V. E. Bonnell and L. Hunt (Berkley: University o f  California Press, 1999), 
p.70
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opened up the study o f cultural object as signs; signs with different and 
multiple meanings. This led to a wide study of cultural objects, including words 
and symbols, looked upon in a cultural system. This analysis is, however, on a 
different level to conceptual analysis. Looking back at Saussure, semiotics is a 
study within langue, while conceptual analysis is within parole. These two 
approaches are not compatible. Not all cultural historians were jSxed to 
semiotic analysis, and it is therefore necessary to look at the differences within 
cultural history to cover those who looked at concepts.
History of concepts is contextuaHst because it sees concepts as cultural 
phenomena that operate relatively and vary according to culture and time. This 
understanding is also shared with New Historicism. New Historicism is a 
movement in literary theory, but as we have seen in earlier chapters, there have 
been strong links between history and literary theory after the linguistic turn. 
New Historicism is ‘concerned with finding the creative power which shapes 
literary works outside the narrow boundaries in which it had hitherto been 
located, as well as within those boundaries.'’^* This is a belief in a special 
relationship between text and context that is particularly relevant to discourse 
analysis. Although this is originally a discipline within literary history, concepts 
are also both ruled by fhek narrow relationship with the text and the wider 
relationship with the discursive context. This methodology might have reached 
the history of cultural concepts because of a connection between cultural 
history and literary history, and constitute the synchronic aspect of conceptual 
history.
Culture without concepts
In beyond the Cultural Turn ftom 1999 it is clear that few of the historians 
have a conceptual understanding.^^ Perhaps it is an answer to the textualist 
approach that was popular twenty-five years earlier. As shown in chapter one, 
there was a growing contextualist interest both in history, social sciences and 
literary theory after, textualism and structuralism had manifested itself for a
Gallagher, Catherine and Stephen Greenblatt; Practicing Neiv Historidsm  (Chicago: University 
o f  Chicago Press, 2000), p .l2  
Beyond the Cultural Turn V . E . Bonnell and L. Hunt eds. (Berkeley: University o f  California 
Press, 1999) The historians represented in this book are vague on what the linguistic or cultural 
turn is. They are linguistically aware, but have not connected this to concepts.
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few decades. Margaret R. Somers finds concepts to be o f interest because they 
are ‘history-laden^ and thus of great help for historians. She writes:
W hen we explore the historical life o f  concepts, the historicity o f  our 
conceptual semantics, w e are likely to find that they themselves have 
histories o f  contestation, transformation, and social relationships — histories 
not unlike the m ore straightforwardly social phenomena that w e study 
regularly.^5
However, Somers does not seem to have the same understanding as the 
historians of political and social concepts, namely that concepts constitute 
society and thus are more important for our possibility to interpret and 
understand. Instead concepts are social and cultural entities. There might be an 
essential difference between political and cultural concepts, but it rather seems 
as if the difference springs from our difference in expectation to cultural and 
political concepts. So, cultural, social and political concepts might be as 
essential concepts and as much part of the social foundation.
Culture is the foundation of language and a focus on langue is also a 
focus on culture. In cultural history it is more common to talk about the 
cultural turn than the linguistic turn, but they mean more or less the same 
process. Victoria Bonnell and Lynn Hunt have difficulties in defining both the 
cultural and the linguistic turn in their introduction to beyond the Cultural Turn. 
They try to see the ‘cultural turn^-historians as one school o f thought, but there 
is quite a lot of variety within this group of historians. They have in common a 
linguistic interest and awareness, and work with anything that can broadly be 
defined as cultural. A cultural turn is a turn from politics and economic 
structures and towards a linguistic and cultural context.
New Cultural history is much more vague and is not really a united 
school of thought. New Cultural History writes microhistory, Hke The Great Cat 
Massacre. It is inspked by Annales and history of mentalités, and also by 
anthropology. Lynn Hunt tried to establish this as an approach by making 
some sort of manifesto in The New Cultural TListory (1989).^ '*^  Other historians
Somers, Margaret R.; ‘The Privatization o f  Citizenship: H ow  to Unthink Knowledge Culture’ 
in Beyond the Cultural Turn eds V. E. Bonnell and L. Hunt (Berkley: University o f  California 
Press, 1999), p .l35
TheNen> CulturalHistoty, ed. Lynn Hunt (Berkley. University o f  California Press, 1989)
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who share this approach are Robert Damton with The Great Cat Massacre and 
Natalie Zemon Davis — and the anthropologist Clifford Geertz who sees 
culture as texts that can be read (the textualist approach) — all of them teaching 
at Princeton. Davis^ The Gift in Sixteenth-Century Trance tells about the meanings 
o f gifts, but in a semiotic rather than semantic way although she looks at this 
concept through semantic analysis when writing that ‘the ancient don and the 
medieval were the most frequently employed, the first more formal than
the second’.^  ^ These histories have borrowed ideas from semiotics and take 
much care in the interpreting o f signs. Thk can be seen as a textualist 
approach. These signs create an order, just as Foucault’s episteme, and these 
orders will constitute historical entities categorised by identities, social groups 
and scientific disciplines.^** The importance of signs must be seen in relation to 
concept since both are carriers o f meaning and relative to context. It seems 
therefore that history of concepts is a very integrated part of post-linguistic 
turn historiography. Sandmo positions himself in a historical tradition that runs 
through Annales history of mentalities, through cultural history and New 
Historicism.
As English does not have its own term for the liistory of collective 
mental consciousness, we tend to talk of mentalités history as a reference to the 
Annales who were the first to talk of Thistoire des mentalités. Mentalité was, for the 
Annales, another layer in their historical understanding, just as economy, 
politics and cultural landscape had stories to tell about the past. Now, this 
genre must be seen to be part of cultural history as the mentality is our 
strongest shared cultural object. A t the same time it has its roots in intellectual 
history and this is where we find the link to conceptual history. There were 
several mentalité Annales historians writing, but closest to histories of concepts 
might we find Robert Mandrou’s works. In Introduction to Modem Trance 1500- 
1640, he makes a conceptual analysis of ‘Man’ in this period.**^  Conceptual
Davies, Natalie, Zemon; The G ift in Sixteenth-Century Trance (Oxford; Oxford University Press,
2000), p-22
Sandmo, Erling Voldssamfunnets undergang. Om disiplineringen an Norge pa 1600-tallet [The 
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analysis can be a means of reaching the mentalité. Even though Mandrou might 
be the historian of mentalité who closest resembles history of concepts, Lucien 
Febvre and Marc Bloch were more influential in developing French Vhistoire des 
mentalités. Foucault continues this tradition and at least The Order of Things and 
Archaeolo^ o f Knowledge must be seen as a work of mentalité history. As we will 
see, there are several concepts in which he is interested, amongst them ‘Man’, 
‘Science’, ‘Knowledge’ and ‘Power’. He sees these concepts as being important 
for social and cultural formation.
Concepts defining cultural man
The essence of culture is difficult to describe, but Raymond Williams 
has made an attempt. Culture and Society 1780-1950 firom 1958 must be classified 
as history of concepts. Williams’ thesis is that there is in the period he 
describes, a number of words that have been of great importance for societal 
development.
came for the first time into com m on English use, or, where they had 
already been generally used in the language, acquired new and important 
meanings. There is in fact a general pattern o f  change in these words, and 
this can be used as a special kind o f  map by which it is possible to  look  
again at those wider changes in life and thought to which the c h a n ts  in 
language evidently refer. Five words are the key points firom which this 
map can be drawn. They are industry, democracy, class, art and culture.^ ^
The book is mainly about the concept ‘culture’, which he sees to be important 
for the construction of society. Williams uses ‘idea’ and not ‘concept’, but he 
does not use a linguistic vocabulary. Though he sees these concepts as being 
changeable and always in a flux; he states that meaning also changes. He does 
not here have the same thorough synchronic and diachronic investigation that 
can be found later. His investi^tions are not as systematic; they rather indicate 
changes. According to Boutcher, Williams’ questions cross the borders of 
social and cultural history with his study of canonical texts and his works must 
be seen in the tradition started by French and German intellectuals in the 
1930s.
98 Williams (1967) , p.xiii
99 Boutcher, Warren; ‘The Analysis o f  Culture Revisited; Pure Texts, Applied Texts, Literary 
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‘M.an^
Michel Foucault’s The Order of things is a history of the concept ‘Man’. 
Foucault looks at the development of the human sciences fiom the 
Enlightenment to modern society. As ‘Man’ is related to subjectivity, the roots 
cannot be traced earlier than Enlightenment. Foucault states his position thus:
W hen natural history becom es biology, when the analysis o f  wealth becom es 
economics, when, above all, reflection upon language becom es philology, 
and Classical discourse, in which being and representation found their 
com m on locus, is eclipsed, then in the profound upheaval o f  such an 
archaeological mutation, man appears in his ambiguous position as an object 
o f  knowledge and as a subject that knows: enslaved sovereign, observed 
spectator, he appears in the place belonging to the king, which was assigned 
to him in advance by 1m s  Meninas, but from which his real presence has so 
long been excluded.
This is a view in opposition to Lovejoy’s treatment of the unit idea Man dating 
back to Ancient Greece, where ‘Man’ is seen as a fixed idea. This shows that 
Foucault’s analysis really is a conceptual analysis, based on conceptual change. 
The term ‘Man’ was first conceptualised in the Enlightenment, but is not fuUy 
a concept until modem nineteenth-century thought when ‘the perpetual 
relation of the cogito to the unthought, the retreat and return of the origin, 
define for us man’s mode of being’.**** Foucault was also influenced by 
conceptual philosophers like CanguUhem, Bachelard, Jean Caveillès, and 
Alexandre Koyre, ‘who fundamentally [...] confironted the opposite 
philosophical tradition of experience and sense, as it was embodied in Sartre 
and Merleau-Ponty, the existentialists and phenomenologists’.***^
Foucault’s histories make use of concept as a critical and philosophical 
cultural history, but he find complications in using ‘Man’ for this philosophical 
project because the human sciences have not managed to get round the 
problem without using this concept o f ‘Man’ that was not present before the 
modem episteme.
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However, it is easy to understand why every time one tries to use the human 
sciences to philosophize, to  pour back into the space o f  thought what one  
has been able to learn o f  man, one finds oneself imitating the philosophical 
posture o f  the eighteenth century, in which, nevertheless, man had no place; 
for by extending the domain o f  knowledge about man beyond itself, and 
thus taking up one’s position once more in a philosophy o f  the Classical 
type. 103
Foucault influenced a more critical cultural history, even though he still saw 
difficulties and faults. Although his works has inspired many, those inspired 
have not always understood the consequences of its break with traditional 
social-historical models.***'*
Although Clifford Geertz cannot be classified as a historian of 
concepts, his conceptual analysis of ‘Man’ is still interesting. As an 
anthropologist, Geertz looks at the concept of ‘Man’ through different cultures 
rather than through time. However, it is interesting to compare his 
observations to Foucault’s. Geertz’s point ‘is not that there are no 
generalisations that can be made about man as man, save that he is a most 
various animal, or that the study o f culture has nothing to contribute towards 
the uncovering of such generalisations.’ Instead he claims that
‘generalizations are not to  be discovered through a Baconian search for 
cultural universals, a kind o f  public-opinion polling o f  the world’s peoples 
in search o f  consensus gentium that does n ot in fact exist, and, further, that the 
attempt to do so leads us to precisely the sort o f  relativism the w hole 
approach waa expressly designed to a v o i d . ’
Foucault is aware firom the start that there will not be a consensus surrounding 
the meaning of the term ‘man’ as he shows in his later studies on power, that 
some men are more equal than others. As language is power, the 
conceptualisation of ‘Man’ will also be a question of power. He writes that
108 Foucault (2002 I), pp.396-7 
104 O ’Brian, p.27
108 Geertz, Clifford; The Interpretation o f Cultures (N ew  York; Basic Book, 1973), p.40
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as a result o f  the importance o f  linguistics and o f  its application to the 
knowledge o f  man, the question o f  the being o f  language, which we have 
seen, is so intimately linked w idi the fundamental problems o f  our culture, 
reappears in all its enigmatic insistence. With the continually extended use o f  
linguistic categories, it is a question o f  growing importance, since w e must 
henceforth ask ourselves what language must be in order to structure this 
way what is neverdreless not in itself either word or discourse, and in order 
to articulate itself on  the pure forms o f  knowledge.*°^
Philippe Aries’ conceptual analysis of ‘Childhood’ in Centuries o f Childhood 
(1962) can be seen as another attempt at understanding the concept of ‘Man’. 
However, Aries is not using linguistics for his conceptual analysis. He is using 
pictures, looking at how they symbolise ‘Man’ in general and ‘children’ in 
particular. From his pictorial investigations he can remark that ‘The density of 
society left no room for the family. Not that the family did not exist as a 
reality: it would be paradoxical to deny that it did. But it did not exist as a 
concept.’***^ Aries is looking for conceptual changes as the essence of society, 
and he finds this. Jenssen comments that Aries’ methodology can be 
categorised as genealogy and that change is therefore accentuated.***®
Witchcraff, d^emonologj^
Stuart Clark’s Thinking with Demons. The Idea of Witchcraft in Earft Modern 
Europe ***** is a clear example of how textualist, linguistic historiography is 
conceptual history without defining itself as that. One should not be confused 
with Clark’s terminology of using the idea o f witchcraft as it is not a fixed idea 
he is investigating, but a changing concept. Clark is aware of the developments 
that have been going on in linguistics and start his book with 150 pages on 
language as used in early modem discourse. It is the linguistic discourse that is 
in focus in Clark’s book, but even though he can be seen to be a discourse 
historian, he is clearly influenced by linguistic philosophy and is perhaps a 
textualist John Bossy defines him as a clear post-linguistic turn historian and
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also defines him within the textualist rhetorical turn.**** Given that Clark sees 
witchcraft to be on a different level then the real world, other laws of causation 
can always explain the chain o f causation explained by witchcraft. Witchcraft is 
a topic that Clark investigates as if it were fiction. He can thus make use of 
methodology firom literary theory and philosophy. Clark writes that after a 
Saussurean linguistic turn it is the coherence of signs that counts, not reference 
to the real world. Clark therefore has two reasons for textualism; first, that he 
believes the history already is a game of referents/signifiers/concepts and he is 
just joining this way of writing history. There are no other philosophically 
legitimately ways of writing history. Secondly, witchcraft is an excellent topic 
for this kind of research because it works with the real world just as fiction 
does — explaining things without really telling “the truth”.
One example of Clark’s textualism is his treatment of the connection 
between women and witches. In explaining why women were classified as 
witches he looks at the rhetorical effects of duality and contrasts. This division 
of male/female and good/evil seems to have as much a poetic means as being 
based in social or political reality.
There are other recurring linguistic and conceptual features o f  the 
arguments about w om en that confirm their deep reliance on binary i
classification. O n e o f  them is a dependence on antithesis as a rhetorical j
figure — an aspect o f  what m ost commentators have seen as the highly |
stylized and artificial character o f  the debate. In medieval letters, the nature !
o f  w om en was a popular them e for rhetorical exercises, and this seems true 
o f  the following age as well. 444
Clark believes there was a certain special linguistic era in early modern Eurt^e '
that appreciated a game with words.**  ^ There was more of an awareness of ;!language than in any other period. With the power of language Bossy sees the |
originality in the thesis that ‘Demonology and the judicial persecution of !
witches wax (and wane) with a theocratic conception of the state witch
produces such doctrines as the divine right of kings’.**^  !
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This divine right was of course also linguistically created and expressed. 
Perhaps their understanding of the world was more poetic and rhetorical than 
how we perceive the world today. Clark describes the poetic polarity and 
duality that existed in the language**'* and this seems also to be linked with 
Foucault’s ‘Otherness’; there is one rational easily described world and then it 
is the otiier. In early modern Europe this othemess was, according to Clark, 
demonology, and, in the case of women, witchcraft As other historians have 
remarked the importance of Clark’s emphasis of the fact that these people 
really believed in magic and thus live in a different reality and linguistic context 
than became evident in later age.**® As Bossy sees it:
The book is about the idea o f  witchcraft, not about the doings o f  witches, 
their victims and accusers in real life; its idea about this idea is that, as 
William Lamont has claimed for millennialism in England, and Osvaldo 
Raggio for banditry in Italy, it is norm al.44^
When it comes to defining Clark within the category of history o f concepts, he 
never says he is working with concepts, but his study is of the concept of 
demonology. The terms and vocabulary differ, and so does the meaning. 
However, Clark deals well with this using a discourse analysis of the early 
modem vocabulary, but also by looking at the changes that happened in the 
centuries investigated. This will account for the synchronic and diachronic 
analysis. Clark is also very philosophically aware and knows the consequences 
proved by a linguistic approach to history. It might be because of this that he 
chose to work with demonology, which is very far from contemporary logic. 
He has also continued working within the topic of language and witchcraft.**^
444 Clark (1997), pp.31-2
448 Sandmo, Erling; ‘M et og mindre sannhet’ [More or less truth] in Historisk Tidsskrift 
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knee'and Tlonour'
Erling Sandmo has written mainly on Norwegian juridical history in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century. Just as he is very concerned with the 
context surrounding his historical subjects, he is always careful to state his own 
context and background. He never uses ‘history of concepts’ but he knows 
well works of Begriffsgeschichte. Sandmo is sensitive to language and meaning, 
and he starts Voldssamjunnets undetgang [The Decline of the Society of Violence] 
with a description of his own uncertainty of what ‘violence’ is.**® He is also 
aware of the possible change in meaning and vocabulary of violence from the 
early modern times and today. He thus wants to investigate the first half of the 
seventeenth century to see if he can find a period of change from an early 
modern to a modern perception of ‘violence’. Sandmo investigates the early 
seventeenth century because he believes it to be a period of change. He has 
undertaken previous works on the eighteenth century and would like to show 
that this society is different. His investigation is limited to two regions where 
legal documents have been carefully preserved. Even though ‘violence’ is 
Sandmo’s main concept of interest, ‘honour’, ‘truth’ and ‘public sphere’ 
(Joffentlighef) is also investigated as these four concepts as they can be seen to be 
strongly interlinked in this society.
Sandmo’s premise is that our understanding of truth is different from 
that of the seventeenth century. At that time honour and honesty were linked; 
telling the truth would be defined by behaving honourably. He can therefore 
start with an analysis of the concept ‘honour’. This analysis is contextualist and 
rektivistic. He understands honour as something that will be ambiguous 
because it is always changmg in a society, but nevertheless it is and was used 
and would thus have a meaning in an “articuktion field”; a group having the 
same understanding and vocabulary. This approach is inspired by David 
Chaney.**** This is also very similar to Foucault’s archaeology of knowledge
448 See Sandmo, Erling; Voldssamjunnets utukTgang. Om disiplineringen av Norge pa 1600-tallet {The 
D ecline o f  the society o f  violence. O n the discipline o f  Norway in the 17th Century] (Oslo; 
Universitetsforlaget, 1999)
449 ibid., p.99
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where the episteme is a group with common knowledge and thus also a 
common vocabulary.*^ **
There is a characteristic of Begriffsgeschichte that it includes both an 
omasiological and a semiological analysis. Sandmo knows of this difference 
and he makes a point of writing of cases in which the concept’s meaning is 
used, but the term is not used. In his investigation of ‘honour’ he admits that 
some of the legal proceedings he is looking at are not classified as dealing with 
honour and the word is not used. Nevertheless, he chooses to count them as 
honour cases because honour is what lies underneath these cases and they 
would not have occurred in this format today. *^* The cases are mainly about 
people suing one another for calling them by animal names. In our legal system 
this would be Hbel action, but in these seventeenth century cases calling of 
animal names suggested that the person was doing something illegal with 
animals, that is handling dead animals. Working with dead animals was not 
considered honourable for members of society and thus naming someone with 
animal names would be an attempt at social exclusion.
The possibility o f a discipline o f Histoiy of Cultural Concepts
All essential concepts make a foundation for society. For historians 
working with political concepts this was particularly clear, but it seems to be 
more disguised in cultural history of concepts. This is strange because cultural 
history seems to be clear that culture is a foundation for society that needs 
investigation, and with a linguistic epistemology the link between concepts and 
society is natural. It is clear that Foucault, Clark and Sandmo base their analysis 
on concepts being a foundation both for the creation and understanding of 
culture. The knowledge of ‘Man’ is an example of how a society perceives 
itself, but also how the structure of that society is. ‘Witchcraft’ seems to be in a 
different category because witchcraft does not immediately seem to be part of 
our understanding of the world. However, this is the importance that Clark 
points out; witchcraft and how a society looks upon witchcraft define this 
society. Witchcraft is part of a different belief-system.*^ Just as the concept
420 Foucault (2002 II), p.212  
424 Sandmo (1999 I), pp.114-5 
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‘Man’ is very important in our society because self-identity is important in our 
culture, but did not exist before the nineteenth century, ‘witchcraft’ was an 
important concept in the period between the fifteenth and eighteenth century, 
but is marginalised in our society. The same is true for ‘violence’, which is a 
concept Sandmo does not find in much use in seventeenth century Norway, 
but that the phenomenon we would classify as ‘violence’ still exists. However, 
concepts hke ‘honour’ and ‘truth’ are more important in this society and thus 
characterises the society to a greater extent. All these historians seem to believe 
that the concepts they have looked at are particularly important for a specific 
society. Although Foucault’s work is mainly on the Enlightenment, ‘Man’ is in 
the foundation for modem society, ‘witchcraft’ is the foundation of society in 
Early Modem Europe, more so than the dogmas of the church according to 
Clark and ‘honour’ was the foundation of early seventeenth century Norway.
These historians came from different backgrounds before they started 
on their work in history o f cultural concepts. Whilst Clark had worked with 
magic and witchcraft for some years and then in 1997 changed into a linguistic 
mode and wrote Thinking with Demons on the concept of ‘witchcraft’, Sandmo 
had always had methodology as his primary interest and had written articles 
inspired by both Foucault and Koselleck’s history of concepts before his 
doctoral thesis turned into a book, Voldssamfunnets undergang on the concept of 
‘violence’. The Order of Things was one of Foucault’s earlier publications, and in 
addition he must be seen as an inspiration for the other two. He had just 
started his work on epistemes and concepts; his inspiration up until then had 
mainly been scientific and religious history. These historians do have in 
common a need for discourse analysis and a need for a hermeneutical 
approach. The concepts that have caught their interest have something to say 
about a society they are not part of; it is perhaps just because o f the conceptual 
changes tbat has happened between these discourses and our society that 
clarifies these questions.
In conclusion it should be mentioned that these three historians are not 
the only ones who have undertaken conceptual inquiries into cultural concepts. 
An interesting study is the Norwegian essay collection Bidrag til Verdienes
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Historié Contributions to a History of ‘Values’. This was an answer to the 
Norwegian government’s ‘Commission of value’ of 1998; it was supposed to 
discuss what important values were in the modem society and how to make 
people aware of this. Some historians were provoked by the fact that no 
historians were invited to this commission and Tor Egü. Forland thus became 
the editor of this collection. N ot all of the contributions can be seen as 
historical — the invitation to contribute was interdisciplinary — but most of 
them are different histories o f the concept ‘value’ or other valuable concepts. It 
includes histories of ‘values’ in seventeenth century and 1930s Norway, in 
feminism and in national identity. In Britain, David Chaney’s works on modem 
and postmodem culture can be seen as conceptual history. He investigates how 
a vocabulary of drama describes our collective experiences and thus enacts a 
social order in his book Fictions o f Collective Ufe (1993).*^ '* He does not look into 
a special study of any concepts in particular, but he looks at how these words 
and concepts constitute a specific society, just as Foucault, Clark and Sandmo 
did.
423 Bidrag til Verdienes Historié [Contributions to a History o f  ‘Values’] ed T. E. Forland (Oslo; 
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Concepts, identity and gender
The search foi' ‘identity’ (national, regnal, sexual), and the definition of alterity, insiders 
and outsiders to a culture, have, in the view of some, changed histoiy beyond recognition.
The twentieth century has seen a conceptualisation of gender. Whilst 
the term ‘gender’ denoted a grammatical form, it became clear as feminism 
developed that the concept o f the socially constructed sex also needed a term. 
‘Women’ and ‘homosexual’ are two concepts that have not been dealt with in 
the traditional history of concepts, but they are concepts mvestigated in gender 
studies. As when it came to cultural concepts, gender historians have not 
categorised themselves as historians o f concepts. This is of course because 
their main concern has not been concepts in general, but one or a few 
concepts in particular and it is not the whole of gender history, women’s 
history or history of homosexuality that have taken a linguistic perspective. 
Gender history is usually much more linguistically aware than more traditional 
women’s history. This chapter will use Joan W. Scott’s definition from Gender 
and the Politics ofH istoy. Inspired by Foucault, she defines gender as ‘knowledge 
about sexual difference.’42fi This is taken to mean the understanding produced 
by cultures and societies o f human relationship that will never be true or 
absolute, but relative. Scott continues:
It is produced in com plex ways within large epistemic frames that 
themselves have and (at least quasi-) autonomous history. Its uses and 
meanings becom e contested politically and are the means by which  
relationships o f  power — o f  dominion and subordination — are 
constructed. Knowledge refers not only to ideas but to institutions and 
structures, everyday practices as well as specialized rituals, all o f  which 
constitute social relationships. Knowledge is a way o f  ordering the world; 
as such it is not prior to social organization.427
425 Hufton, Olwen; ‘W omen, Gender and the Fin de S iic li in Companion to Historiography ed M. 
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D e Beauvoir’s offspring
Gender k  linguistically created by society; and this has been universally 
known since Simone de Beauvoir stated that a ‘woman’ is not bom, but made 
— ‘every female human being is not necessarily a woman; to be so considered 
she must share in tihat mysterious and threatened reality known as 
fernininity.’*^® De Beauvoir’s title. The Second Sex, declares that there is not 
equality in gender questions. The category of 'the Other' is central to the 
making of identity. Identification and identity are therefore closely linked to 
gender. Gender-divisions are not connected to biology, but are dependent on 
how languages identify and classify. In addition there is the more difficult — 
difficult for the historian who tries to grasp this objectively - aspect of 
experience and identity. Just as ‘class-consciousness’ was important for the 
analysis of ‘class’ sexual-consciousness has been very important for the 
concepts ‘gay’, ‘lesbian’ and ‘queer’ and it has been raised in the discussion of 
‘women’.
Michel Foucault continued in de Beauvoir’s footsteps and continued 
the interest in ‘the Other’ in the definition of gender and sexuality. In addition 
he brings in a linguistic methodology of investigation. De Beauvoir’s influence 
on the general public debate was great, so Foucault might not have felt that she 
directly influenced him. As de Beauvoir has been a strong source of 
inspiration for ferninists, Foucault has become, unintentionally, an inspiration 
for homosexual activists. Theoretical developments in the last five decades 
have made constructivism important and Foucault and de Beauvoir have been 
used to support this view.
As ‘gender studies’ is a discipline that developed in the 1980s, its theory 
is to a large extent based on postmodern philosophy. There is a strong 
linguistic and conceptual awareness because of the importance of identity. The 
methodology of history of concepts is therefore compatible with gender 
history. The reason why history o f concept has not been occupied with gender 
concepts, is because of the masculine perspective political concepts 
encourages. This is not surprising as, according to Bonnie G. Smith, the
428 Beauvoir, Simone de; (London: Jonathan Cape, 1953)[Fitst Ftench edition
1949], p .l3
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historical profession has, or at least had until the 1970s, a masculine 
perspective.*^*’ However, this should not be a handicap for histories of gender 
concepts. It must be agreed that the concepts ‘men’, ‘women’, ‘homosexual’ 
and ‘heterosexual’, are as essential in defining society as the political and social 
concepts which the Begriffsgeschkhte historians have seen as the foundation of 
society. In the last chapter, it was pointed out that these historians had picked 
out concepts that were particularly defining for a society. Gender history is 
perhaps as much a contemporary manifestation of identity. These concepts are 
of great importance in our society. Nevertheless, gender history also looks at 
conceptual change and the roots of these concepts.
W omen’s history and Gender Studies
Gender became a historiographical category in the 1960s, first as a 
result of female emancipation movement but it developed into a discipline that 
questioned male and female roles.*®** It was, nevertheless, first in the 1980s that 
it became common to talk rather o f ‘gender history’, than ‘women’s history’, 
but the change of term created much debate.*®* In contrast to women’s history, 
gender history developed to include other questions of gender identities than 
‘woman’; for example ‘gay’, ‘lesbian’, ‘homosexual’ and ‘queer’. The identity 
and emancipatory aspect of gender history relate this discipline to feminists 
and gay activists and becomes more political than women’s history ever has 
been. The interest in gender history does not necessarily come from gender 
studies. Gender was also an important question amongst New Cultural History 
historians as they valued the emancipatory function of historiography. *®^ The 
sources of exploitation and domination were to be found in the many 
interpersonal relations in which human beings exert power over others.
Although women have not had a central position m previous centuries’ 
historiography, they have been there in the background. Women’s history, on 
the other hand, gives women the limelight on the historical stage. The concept 
of ‘women’s history’ has probably gone through the same conceptualisation
429 Smith, Bonnie G. The Gender ofH istoy. Men, Women, and Historical Practice (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1998)
438 Bentley, Michael; Modem Historiograply. A n  Introduction (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 143-4 
431 Hufton, p. 932 
132 Iggers , p. 99
67
process as ‘women’. Although the term has changed, women’s history is stiU 
also exarnined iu a more traditional way. N ot aU historians are interested in 
identity questions or linguistic change as gender questions presupposes. 
Women’s history started out wanting to tell the history of women of the past, 
and it is still done that way. The discipline of women’s history and gender 
history has developed along the same twist and turns as other historiographical 
disciplines. Women’s history is, therefore, part o f social history in the mid- 
twentiefh century, and it is the linguistic and postmodernist changes that 
develop gender history.
Leonore Davidoff has an interesting linguistic history from a non- 
conceptual perspective in her essay collection Worlds Between on class and 
gender. Her main aim is to tell about the identity of women who worked in the 
nineteenth century England, especially in domestic service. Her identity 
approach gives her a conceptual analysis as well. The counterconcept of 
man/woman was used in an attempt to define the ambiguity of women, as 
were the ideas of beauty and ugliness, morality, sin and desire.*®® These ideas 
and the vocabulary along with it constructed both gender and class. Davidoff 
shows that identity and language was interwoven, but does not look upon 
concepts as a foundation for society. She is more interested in how ambiguous 
concepts or categories complicated identity.
Given the structure o f  gender categories and their centrality to the 
nineteenth-century concept o f  the family with its attendant male 
breadwinner, female housewife, non-working child roles, as weU as the 
language o f  femininity and masculinity, it is not difficult to understand why 
w om en in public life posed  such a threat to identity -  for both men and
women. 434
Through this comment, however, she demonstrates that these concepts were 
essential in the structure of nineteenth century family and society. Her analysis 
does not include a study of conceptual change. It is rather a discourse analysis 
o f the ‘women’ in the nineteenth century. She has a critical attitude to how 
modem historians have looked upon the concept, but in addition how it was
433 Davidoff, Leonore; Worlds Between. Historical Perspectives on Gender and Class (Cambridge: 
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treated at the time. There has, she claims, been too much emphasis on b io lo g y  
and too little on language, both then and now.
Gender and the linguistic turn
Historians working with gender, class, ethnic minorities and other 
minority groups are more aware o f conceptual ambiguity than most historians. 
These histories are necessarily linked to identity and perhaps they also are 
inevitably part of the linguistic turn. Identity is, in postmodern theory, not 
linked to belonging to natural categories and to taxonomic system, but to 
linguistic definition. Since interpretation and meaning are important parts of 
linguistic definitions they will always become more ambiguous and vague than 
for instance biological definition. Definition of sex is, in normal cases easy, but 
the definition of gender is more complex. The complexity of language makes 
an unambiguous definition difficult. To make this definition possible it is easy 
to turn to counter examples. Although a process of conceptualisation has been 
important within gender history, it should also be possible to write conceptual 
history of related concepts such as ‘child’, ‘family’, ‘incest’, and ‘feminism’, 
which usually are not conceptualised within gender studies. These concepts 
might be interesting for historians of cultural concepts.
Although conceptualisation was a phenomenon that started in the 
nineteenth century, concepts are of more importance in a linguistic 
epistemology. KoseUeck preferred to talk of a conceptual turn rather than a 
linguistic turn, because he saw the conceptualisation process as continuing into 
our society and just beginning to become more important. Joan Scott sees the 
conceptualisation of gender concepts as a general trend of post-structuralism, 
where meaning is not fixed and tools that can handle ambiguity are useful.
Instead o f  attributing a transparent and shared meaning to cultural concept, 
post-structuralists insist that meanings are not fixed in a culture’s lexicon, 
but are rather dynamic, always potentially in flux. Their study therefore calls 
for attention to d ie conflictual processes that establish meanings, to the 
ways in which such concepts as gender acquire the appearance o f  fixity, to 
the challenges posed for normative social definitions, and to the ways these 
challenges are m et — in other words, to the play o f  force involved in any 
society’s construction and implementation o f  meanings; to politics. 435
435 Scott (1988), p.5
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Her comments are on gender, but could refer to all concepts and all identity 
questions. Working within post-linguistic turn historiography is a dynamic 
activity always in movement because of different interpretations. The 
movement is both between the historical identities and counterconcepts and 
with the historians’ hermeneutic and linguistic experience. This must be seen as 
being part of the critical aspect o f history of concepts.
Gender studies started out as a critical, agressive discipline, but gender 
history today seems to have lost its aggression. Olwen Hufton is interested in 
knowing which attitudes young, female historians have to gender studies. It 
would be interesting to know if the change firom ‘women’s history’ to ‘gender 
history’ made for a change in attitude. The answer she got from female Oxford 
undergraduates in the late 1990s was this:
W omen should have a history, but it should also reflect their relationships 
with other wom en as well as with men and the wider community. W omen  
are clearly bearers o f  tradition, shapers o f  the next generation and so 
colluders in the construction o f  gender roles. Many have been victims, but 
not all were innocent. 436
This does not seem to be particularly critical or political. She does not 
comment much upon these results. Perhaps this attitude show that the critical 
position for history of concepts in gender history is not present at the moment. 
When Riley earlier wrote that women had a “stronger case” with the category 
of ‘women’ than homosexuals had with ‘homosexual’, she might unconsciously 
have seen that the political debate is more active for ‘gay rights’ and ‘gay 
identity’ than women’s issues and this has affected gender history too.
The roots of feminism do probably have the same roots as the 
conceptualisation of ‘women’. It is interesting to note here that when John 
Stuart Mill discuss the rolls of the sexes and thus uses ‘women’ in The Subjection 
of Women, ‘women’ does not occur as a concept.
That the principle which regulates the existing social relations between the 
two sexes — the legal subordination o f  one sex to the other — is wrong in 
itself, and now  one o f  the chief hindrances to human improvement; and
436 Hufton, p.939
70
that it ought to  be replaced by a principle o f  perfect equality, admitting no
power or privilege on the one side, nor disability on the o t h e r . ‘ 3 7
As this is a century before the linguistic turn, it is not surprising that Mill is not 
aware of the importance of concepts, but it is worth noting that the concept of 
‘human’; or ‘Man’ as Foucault investigated, seems to exist. Perhaps the 
conceptualisation of a political vocabulary o f masculine interest was earlier 
than a conceptualisation of language including women and minorities.
Identity
The focus on identity iti historiography is a recent interest. It is based 
on postmodern relativism and linguistic discourse. Identity is closely related to 
concepts because it is linguistically created, just as de Beauvoir stated for 
female identity. Identity is linguistically created, thus concepts are connected to 
concepts. Identity is connected to identifying categories. Categories are again 
connected to concepts because the way we have knowledge of categories 
resembles how we have knowledge of concepts. In the same way as concepts 
are defined by counterconcepts, categories will have parallel categories. The 
categories changes as opinion on what they should include changes. However, 
in contrast to concepts that are the basis for society, categories are creators of 
structure. Aletta Biersack writes about Marshall Sahlin’s Island of Histoiy where 
‘structure’ refers to ‘cultural categories conceived, Saussure-Hke, as a 
conceptual grid: a system of differences, a set of categories. This grid 
encompasses social statuses (chief, commoner, woman, man), the names of 
divinities — in fact, the entire indigenous order in all its political, social and 
religious dimensions.’*®® The link to social status seems to be relevant in gender 
history where the concepts also refer to categories of social status.
On the question of identity, Scott is interested in its link to experience 
and therefore poses these questions:
H ow  can w e hbtoridze “experience”? H ow  can w e write about identity 
without essentializing it? Answers to the second question ought to point 
toward answers to the first, since identity is tied to notions o f  experience.
‘37 Mill, John Stuart; ‘The Subjection o f  W om en’ in O nU berty <& The Subjection of Women (Ware: 
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and since both identity and experience are categories usually taken for 
granted in ways that I am su^;esting they ougjht n ot to  be.‘39
Her critical attitude, however, would seem unnecessary if a conceptual method 
had been used. Histories of concepts do not take identity and experience for 
granted and might therefore be excluded from her critique. Since history of 
concepts is based on discourse analysis, identity and experience will be 
something collective that will have a common understanding of the concept or 
at least some intersubjective understanding. She makes a point later in the 
article that experience is both something individual and something collective, 
but even the collective experience or memory would have been created by 
individual experiences. This is why she has problems in finding the essence in 
identity. Discourse analysis does not take away the individual, but looks rather 
at the collective than the individual. The essence in a concept — or identity — 
would He in the language; the shared language and knowledge of the discourse.
Counterconcepts are close to Foucault’s writing about ‘the Other’. As 
counterconcepts is a couplet of concepts, usually where one is positive and the 
other negative, one strong and the other suppressed, which makes the meaning 
less ambiguous, ‘the Other’ will always be the concept representing the 
negative part. Both ‘women’ and ‘homosexuals’ have been classified as the 
opposition of what is normal; namely ‘men’ and ‘heterosexuals’. Foucault saw 
the need to write the history of the suppressed. Those belongmg to the 
category of ‘the Other’ have the experience of not being normal and this is often 
the background to the writing of these histories. However, histories of 
experience will always be difficult for the historian because of the subjectivist 
point of view. Scott claims that the experience excludes the possibiHty of a 
history of concepts.
(T)he project o f  making experience visible precludes critical examination o f  
the workings o f  the ideological system itself, its categories o f  representation 
(hom osexual/heterosexual, m an/w om an, black/white as fixed immutable 
identities), its premises about what these categories mean and how  they 
operate, its notions o f  subjects, origin, and cause. The project o f  making
‘39 Scott, Joan W.; ‘“Experience”’ in Feminists Theori:^ the Political eds. J. Butler and J. W. Scott 
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experience visible precludes analysis o f  the workings o f  this system and o f
its historicity; instead it reproduces its terms.‘48
This is an important point, but we must not forget that the experience perhaps 
is the gateway to analysing a concept, and can thus be a way to essential 
concepts. However, as experience is based on individual and not shared 
accounts, as it would be in discourse, it does not have any interest in a 
conceptual analysis. As memory and experience history seems to be of interest 
in contemporary historiography, history of concepts and history of experience 
might become conflicting approaches within gender history.
Concepts o f gender identity
In the vocabulary of gender history, the ‘category of women’ is spoken 
of more often than ‘the concept o f women’ although the former is treated as a 
concept. It seems to be important for these historians that ‘women’ is an 
object that is classified and not an abstract idea. This is a contradiction when it 
really is the essence of the meaning of ‘women’ they are looking for and not 
the physical women. The methods they use seem, nevertheless, to take 
conceptual consideration into account. These theories appear to be able to 
handle the ambiguity that lingers in the word. Looking through history there 
have been different criteria used to classify the ideal-type ‘woman’, and this 
might be the reason for talking of gender as categories. I am not sure, however, 
if the category of ‘women’ wiU require the same analysis as the concept of 
‘women’. Foucault analyzed the concept of ‘homosexuality’ and John Boswell 
wrote on the concept ‘gay’. These studies were based on the relationship 
between the concepts and self-identity. As Riley has pointed out, there has 
been criticism, stating that ‘woman’ has to be treated differently because 
neither identity nor self-identity is necessary for a classification o f women. This 
must be criticism that takes physical characteristics in to account, not only 
gender divisions. It seems to me that ‘women’ is not only a category, but also a 
concept. If gender is created linguistically and contextually, it should at least be 
possible to treat it as a concept even though it might not be the proper
‘48 ibid, p.25
‘4‘D enise Riley uses category o f  w om en on page 1, but concept ‘wom en’ p.47 in ^Am I  That 
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linguistic term for it. There might have been a debate in gender theory on the 
problem of ‘category^ and ‘concept’, but it seems elusive.
Because the discussion of gender identities is based on categories and 
not concepts, it is possible to discern whether all of these categories are of the 
same kind. Denise Riley writes on the category of ‘women’ in relation to 
‘homosexual’ based on biological differences:
Here som e might retort that there are real, concrete wom en. That what 
Foucault did for the concept o f  ‘the homosexual’ as an invented 
classification just cannot be done for w om en, who indubitably existed long  
before the nineteenth century unfolded its tedious mania for fresh 
categorisations. That historical constructionism has run mad if  it can 
believe otherwise. H ow  can it be overlooked that wom en are a natural as 
well as a characterised category, and that their distinctive needs and 
sufferings are all too real? And how  could a politics o f  wom en, feminism, 
exist in the company o f  such an apparent fheoreticist disdain for reality, 
which it has mistakenly conflated with ideology as i f  the two were on e?‘42
Just as much gender history is written for a political purpose, it is important for 
Rdey to make a point of “the Othemess” and she seems to believe that will be 
best marked if women’s questions are more important than homosexual 
history. If this had been a conceptual discussion, both concepts would have 
been linguistically constructed; a discussion based on which is the most real 
would be superfluous. Even though all sorts of gender identities are social 
constructions there seems to be a difference in the treatment of the concept 
‘women’ from the concept ‘gay’. One usually speaks of the category Voman’, 
not concept, and the concept ‘gay’. This seems to imply that ‘women’ are a part 
of the taxonomy of the masculine and feminine sex, while ‘gay’ is a constructed 
identity. However, this might be just a matter of confusion of terms for all 
gender theory has in common that they feel like 'the Other'.
‘Woman’
Historians looking into women’s history do not necessarily look upon 
the vocabulary that is creating woman. They are more concerned with the 
cultural and economical reasons for women’s position. Often studies of the 
concept of women will be indirect; a linguistic analysis will be in addition to
‘42 Riley, Denise; ^Am I  That Name?’ Feminism and the Category o f Women ’in H istoiy (Basingstoke; 
Macmillan, 1988),p.3
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another argumentation- Denise Riley, however, has a good example of a history 
of the concept ‘women’ in ‘A m  I  that Name?’ (1988). She starts of with stating 
her problem:
This ‘w om en’ is not only an inert and sensible collective; the dominion o f  
fictions has a wider sway then that. The extent o f  its reign can be partly 
revealed by looking at the crystallisations o f  ‘w om en’ as a category. T o  put 
it schematically; ‘w om en’ is historically, discursively constructed, and always 
relative to other categories which themselves change; ‘wom en’ is a volatile 
collectivity in which female persons can be very differently positioned, so 
that the apparent continuity o f  the subject o f  Svomen’ isn’t to  be relied on; 
V om en’ is both synchronicaUy and diachronicaUy erratic as a collectivity, 
while o f  the individual, ‘being a wom an’ is also inconstant, and can’t 
provide an ontological foundations^)
Although Riley’s analysis of ‘women’ is very similar to history of concept, is it 
doubtful that she has been inspired by this methodology. Nevertheless, the 
claim that ‘women’ is historically and discursively constructed is similar to the 
foundational role essential concepts have in other conceptual histories. There 
is the same contextual perception and awareness of synchronic and diachronic 
ambiguity. This interpretation also claims that ‘woman’ has no ontological 
foundation and this is a strong claim o f relativity. This study is politically 
interested in women, but at the same time it is more interested in the language 
than the women themselves. This is most Hkely due to a real acceptance o f the 
linguistic epistemology after the linguistic turn and its relativity. Riley’s 
argument is based on conceptual change as showed in her argument that there 
was a conceptual change in the use of ‘women’ in the seventeenth century; 
‘rather that ‘women’ itself comes to carry an altered weight, and that a re­
ordered idea of Nature has a different intimacy of association with ‘woman’ 
who is accordingly refashioned.’*'*'* This conceptual analysis is based on writing 
on women and feminism, and sees ‘women’ as a political concept that has been 
essential for our perception of society.
Joan Scott writes in Gender and the Politics o f Histoiy that there are many 
aspects to women’s history and one o f them is attempts to conceptualise 
gender.*'*® Denise Riley must be seen to belong to this tradition. It is perhaps
‘43 ibid, pp-1-2
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necessary to make the point clear here that history of gender concepts only is 
one part of gender history and will never be able to be the only approach to 
^ n d e r history. Scott mentions the works of Joan Kelly and Natalie Zemon 
Davis and their understanding of the need to see women’s history including 
the making of gender and their significance, this being as important as other 
classifications as class and race.
This could be accomplished by examining social definitions o f  gender as 
they were expressed by m en and wom en, constructed in and affected by 
economic and political institutions, expressive o f  a range o f  relationships 
that included not only sex but also class and power. '^*®
I
However, Scott has also later, in H isto^ and Feminism  ^ another important I
remark about the classification of ‘women’ based on difference. She mentions j
that there has been controversy among feminist historians about whether or |
not this effort is even appropriate. j
The controversy is symptomatic o f  the tensions within feminist history, !
between the political imperative to essentialize Svomen’ and the relativizing |
effects o f  history. Som e historians have argued that attention to the j
construction o f  categories o f  difference distracts them from the activities o f  i
real women; others have suggested that ‘relativism’ undermines the !
possibilities for political action; still others maintain that differences i
(between w om en and m en and among women) are self-evident facts that j
need only be reported and are unnecessarily complicated by abstract |
theoretical analysis. j
This is an important point showing that women’s history and feminist history 
might he conceptual, but does not have to be so. Scott does not mention 
names in this context, but it seems likely that only historians influenced by the 
linguistic turn would be interested in history of the concept ‘women’, while 
women’s history in general can be attractive both from the academic 
perspective of broadening the historic discipline and fcom a political 
perspective of feminism. The difference between women’s history and gender 
history might be important here, as women’s history does not necessarily have
ibid, p. 23
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any linguistic interest. It is the identity question of gender history that makes 
conceptualisation interesting.
There is a problematic aspect of the study of ‘women’. The concept 
‘women’ refers to white middle-class women unless it has not been specifically 
designed to write the history of women of colour, working-class women, 
indigenous women or colonised women.^'’® From the 1980s more histories on 
the variety of women’s history have been written, but that means that the 
concept of women is even more ambiguous. It seems as if none has managed 
to write on the concept o f ‘women’ from an inclusive perspective. It would be 
interesting to see if there are different conceptual changes in different historical 
contexts. Judith Butler sees an additional problem to how ‘women’ has been 
studied;
Within feminism, it seem s as i f  there is som e political necessity to speak as 
and for women, and I would not contest tihat necessity. [...] But this 
necessity needs to be reconciled with another. The minute that the category 
o f wom en is invoked as describing the constituency for which feminism  
speaks, an internal debate invariable begins over what the descriptive 
content o f  that term will be.^ *^ ®
Feminism and history of concepts seem incompatible because the identity 
between the subject and the audience limits a critical analysis. A conceptual 
analysis shovfld not create identity, but show a concept, and its identity, has 
changed through history.
‘H om osexual’, ‘gay’
The H isto^ of Sexuality is often taken and the classic study o f the 
concept ‘homosexual’ despite the fact that this book hardly mentions the term. 
Foucault, nevertheless, looks at the conceptual change of ‘sexuality’, especially 
connected to the entirely different discourses of ars erotica and sdentia sexualisF^ 
The concept of ‘homosexual’ is made clear through the suppression techniques 
of sdentia sexualis, which also creates the concept. Foucault’s argument is that it
Spongberg, Mar^ Writing Women's History Since the 'Renaissance (Basingstoke; Palgrave, 2002), 
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is the linguistic discourses and the power of the Church that have a joint 
responsibility for the development of the Western concepts on sexuality. There 
must be a reciprocal interaction between how the language has created this 
society and how society, with the Church as its principal actor, influenced the 
language to create the power needed to control the masses. Compared to 
Foucault’s study of ‘Man’, where the conceptualisation of the term defines the 
modem society, this study sees the conceptual changes of ‘sexuality’ to define 
always the discourse and society it is used in. However, the conceptualisation 
o f ‘homosexual’ in the nineteenth century is representative of what Foucault in 
general calls the Victorian regime.^^  ^ For Foucault these concepts are his main 
focus of research, but there are others who only find it necessary to look at a 
concept for definition before approaching other tasks in the historical work.
Gender historians could find out about gender relations through a 
conceptual study just as Foucault analysed power relations through concepts. 
Foucault’s works have been of great inspiration to gender theorists, and it 
might be through him that conceptual analysis became a part of gender history. 
Denise Riley emphasises the importance of the first volume of The History of 
Sexuality, When it came out in 1976 it did not only ‘characterize the nineteenth- 
century construction of “homosexuality” but also, in placing “sex” in the 
modem sense as an aspect of the history of the present, it opened the way to 
the historicizing of any category, including that of “women”.’^ ^^  Foucault made 
the importance of language very clear, especially in the process of constructing 
concepts. Historians o f concepts usually stress the importance of the 
nineteenth century as a period of conceptualisation. Foucault made this clear 
about the concept o f ‘homosexuality’, but this made it also possible to look at 
the conceptualisation of ‘women’ at the same time.
John Boswell was interested in the concept ‘gay’, both in contrast to 
the term ‘homosexual’ and historically how this concept has been without a 
term. In his early book Christianity, Social Tolerance and Homosexuality (1980) he
451 ibid.,p.3-13
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spends a chapter defining ‘gay’ as his area of research/^^ He suggests the 
concept ‘gay’ to be defined by self-identity in comparison with homosexuality, 
which usually is linked to homosexual practice. Boswell can then continue his 
research on the concept of this self-identity. The concept of ‘gay’ is further 
investigated in his book on homosexual marriages in pre-modern Europe, The 
Marriage of Ukeness, where he is aware of the difficulty of translating this 
concept both over language and time barriers.^^  ^This concept must therefore 
be defined by a use of vocabulary and an understanding of cultures of same- 
sex friendships o f that period. There were critiques of Boswell’s works; not on 
the fact that he was attempting history of the concept ‘gay’, but of his 
methodological capabilities. David F. Greenberg goes through the debates that 
have been going on over the two terms malakoi and arsenokoitai whether they do 
mean homosexual or not. He criticises Boswell for always having other 
interpretations without really having good arguments.*®  ^This is in his reference 
to his book on early Christian attitudes to homosexuals. An even more 
thoroughly criticrim comes form Lutz Kaelber in a review of The Marriage of 
Ukeness:
D oes Boswell convincingly demonstrate the truth o f  his main argument?
The answer to this question depends heavily on  whether the author is 
correct in rendering a key term in the major Greek manuscripts as ritual 
solemnizing a marriage-type union between men: ade^hoiesis, meaning, 
literally, “the making o f  a brother,” Here, in fact, historical and philological 
specialists have already raised strong doubts about the lexicographical 
adequacy o f  Boswell’s m odem  circumlocution. In the reading o f  the texts, 
the term denotes the ecclesiastical sanctification o f  spiritual brotherhood  
between men, without further romantic or sexual i m p l i c a t i o n s d ^ s
Kaelbet is critical of Boswell’s results and the quality of his research, but he 
does not seem to criticise the attempts at writing conceptual history. If it is so 
that the meaning o f adelphoiesis does not correspond to the meaning of ‘gay 
marriage’, then Boswell’s conceptual study must be considered bad research.
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but it is nevertheless research on the principles of history of concepts. 
Histories on ‘homosexuality’ are critical, just as gender history of ‘women’. It is 
not surprising that Boswell can be seen as a critical historian, perhaps a 
characteristic of linguistic historians. Alan Bray, in an obituary of John Boswell 
in History Workshop Journal, takes a more favourable attitude towards Boswell’s 
research and writes: ‘To have been there in those years when \Christianity, Social 
Tolerance, and Homosexuality] appeared was to leam a lesson about the still open 
possibilities of history not easily forgotten.’*^  ^ However, history of concepts 
should not be satisfied with being critical; conceptual awareness needs accuracy 
as well.
The fate of gender history
‘Gender’ is itself a concept that should be investigated. It is necessary 
to be sensitive to historical relativism when it comes to gender questions. Both 
the vocabulary and ideas of gender are new and a conceptual investigation will 
therefore mainly follow phenomena, vocabulary and meaning in different paths 
until they unite into our concepts in the twentieth century. Sandmo writes 
about Karine Jensdatter who in 1789 was allowed by the King to change her 
name to Casper Jensen because she was really a man and wanted to marry the 
girl he had made pregnant. Sandmo questions why Karine’s sex had not been 
questioned earlier. Some rumours existed but no one seemed to care; she lived 
and worked hke a woman hence she was a woman. Sandmo finds to other 
examples in history fcom France about women turning into men. These are 
earlier examples and he show how Aristotelian and Galenian anatomy 
described women as unfulfilled men, and thus made a change fcom woman to 
man seem possible. Gender is not an issue; this is a simple sex understanding 
of biology. Only with the microscope and the possibility of looking at cells did 
the difference between man and women became known.^^ ®
Although Riley and Foucault seem to be exceptions in there methodical 
studies of gender concept, this does not mean that there have not been
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attempts. Gender history has developed a linguistic awareness that make 
Rosalind Miles’ The Women*s History of the World (1988) look old-fashioned with 
her lack of linguistic analysis. The conceptualisation of gender concepts 
seems to follow the same pattern as political and cultural concepts in being 
part of the conceptualisation process of modernity. Gender concepts might 
have had a still stronger conceptual change in the twentieth century. ‘Gender’ 
itself has gone through a conceptualisation process in the twentieth century 
and this might be a reason why historians have not yet been interested in the 
conceptual investigation. As it was remarked in the section of ‘women’, there 
might be a variety of gender concepts that has not yet been looked at or at least 
not through a conceptual analysis; ‘black women’, "working women’, ‘lesbian’, 
‘queer’. Histories of concept are traditionally undertaken within a country or 
one linguistic sphere to keep the discourse aspect of the inquiry, but as in other 
history of concepts a comparison between conceptualisation processes would 
be beneficial. It might also be o f interest to compare to the conceptualisation 
process of other concepts; ‘class’, ‘coloured’, ‘feminism’, ‘industry’, ‘children’ 
‘identity’. ‘Women’, ‘class’ and ‘working women’ seem a natural group. Gender 
history has the advantage of being created after the linguistic turn and thus 
being open for conceptual analysis.
459 Miles, Rosalind; The Women’s H istoy o f the World (London: Michael Joseph, 1988)
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Part III
Koselleck and Foucault:
Histories of concepts with a purpose
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5 History of Concepts as a way to understanding 
modernity: Reinhart Koselleck
Past facts and contemporaryjudgement are, mthin the practice of investigation, the terminohgical 
poles which correspond to objectivity and partiality in epistemology.^ ^^
Reinhart Koselleck has become well known in the historical discourse 
for his original contribution to the understanding of historical temporality. His 
investigations spring out of his historical work on the development of political 
society alongside modernity. KoseUeck’s work can be seen to develop in three 
stages even though modernity and historical temporality always are essential. 
First is his involvement in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe which were much 
influenced by the other editors and thus in the traditional German tradition of 
historicism. Secondly, he develops history of concepts to be more discursive 
and thus more linguistic. The foundation for his investigation is still modernity. 
Thirdly, he develops his own vocabulary of concepts including ‘space of 
experience’ and ‘horizon of expectation’ which again makes his ideas on 
historical temporality possible. As this thesis is interested in historical thought 
after the linguistic turn, the two later phases are in focus here.
His work is identified with the focus on Sattele^it, the period between 
1750 and 1850 which Koselleck claims as being the period where society, 
especially, political society, went fcom a pre-modem state to modernity. His 
most notable concepts are ‘space of experience’ and ‘horizon of expectation’. 
This chapter will concern itself with how Koselleck investigates modernity 
through essential concepts and historical temporality, and intends to argue that 
KoseUeck’s historical and philosophical aspects are closely linked. His 
understanding of time and temporality is a prerequisite for his writing about 
modernity. At the same time, historical temporality is something he has found
450 Koselleck, Reinhart; Futures Past. On the Semantics of Hinorical Time Ttansl. Keith Tribe 
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from his historical research. Koselleck is occupied with modernity because he 
claims there was a shift in the political and social vocabulary and terminology 
from about 1750 and this ‘Neuzeif was a ‘neue Zeit’ - a new time or a new 
era.^ "^  ^The change was from a pre-modem to a modem society. This change is 
therefore the foundation of our society and culture. By studying this history 
win we gain a better understanding of our own time. Koselleck can be seen to 
have two different projects through his career. The first is to understand 
contemporary society through a conceptual analysis of past societies, especially 
the period we call modernity. The second project is to understand temporality 
and the experience of time through conceptual analysis. Although these ate 
two entirely different projects, they share the method and the common belief 
in concepts as a foundation for explanation.
The essence of modernity
Modernity is an essential historical concept that is best described 
through its relation to other essential concepts, Koselleck claims that ‘progress’ 
is the most striking concept defining modernity; especially since he believes 
progress is still important for the way we look on time and temporality. This 
view depends on our society continuing to have modernist values, not post­
modern, late modem or any other relativistic view. The concept ‘progress’ is, 
according to Koselleck, ‘the first historical concept which reduced the 
temporal difference between experience and expectation to a single concept.’ 
Progress is the relationship between the past and the future, but it is a strict 
power relationship which gives the future more value than the past, and thus 
favours expectation over experience. Progress combines experiences and 
expectations as both are endowed with a temporal coefficient o f change. There 
are many concepts that are interlinked for Koselleck, but ‘progress’ is a 
concept that seems to be important whatever he writes about. This is because 
progress is the key word for modem society. When it comes to understanding 
history, ‘progress’ is the characteristic change that happened after the
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eighteenth century; ot rather it was the social and economic progress that 
altered the views on change. Change is a concept that modifies its meaning 
through conceptualisation as it is linked to modernisation and progress.
Modem history cannot be written without understanding change, just as 
progress and pre-modem history cannot be understood unless one is aware of 
one’s own notion of progress and of the fact that it did not exist before the 
eighteenth century. The change of concepts in the past affects how easily we 
can understand the past. When we become aware of anachronisms we cannot 
ignore them, and misunderstood concepts are clearly anachronistic.
Koselleck stiU beheves in a modern — nineteenth-century — 
understandiag of history. ‘History’ being a modem concept it is also linked to a 
new understanding of the past. Koselleck does not seem to have made his own |
definition of the past is and what history is, but he often uses the phrase ‘the
modem understanding of history’ and he gives the impression of including I
both himself and nineteenth-century historians in this. What we then have to 
look at is what he means by the modem understanding of the past. It is clear
that he contrasts this with both cyclical historiography, a Christian coming of |
Christ and even the secular Historia mantra vitae\ that history is society’s moral !
1teacher. The modem understanding of history is based upon looking at the j
past for its own sake, not as a guide. This can be seen as a ‘re-presentation’ of i
the past.*®^  The study of the past reads the narration of the past in a reflective j
way, but in a way that has no moral purpose. Koselleck seems to be very
faithful to the historicist understanding of history. It is a focus on the
singularity of events, which is the theoretical premise of both historicism and
of the doctrine of progress. The singularity o f events knows no intractability
and hence permits no direct instruction. ‘History’ and a hritorical
understanding are thus an elemental features o f modernity.
It is the political development that creates modernity and KoseHeck’s 
essential concepts are aU connected to political formation; states and societies 
in particular. Pirn den Boer emphasise Koselleck’s investigation of ‘Staat’
[State] in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe as a good example of Koselleck’s
463 ibid, p. 142
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significance on the dynamics o f modetnity/^^ The state in the Sattek^it was 
seen as the driving force of progress. In addition, the concept carried an 
ambiguity of what society was; there were contradictory views of society. Both 
states and ‘state’ were created at this time. Modernity’s dynamics can best be 
summed up by dynamic concepts; ‘politicisation’, ‘démocratisation’, the 
development of ‘ideologies’ and the change of temporality. The interest in the 
political development in modernity can be seen already in Critique and Crisis 
which is a study of the emergence of modem state and society. Politicisation 
and démocratisation shape the concept o f the new state. This happens within 
the linguistic developing process of ideologies with the new temporality as 
context.
The conceptual turn and the linguistic foundation of society
‘AU language is historicaUy conditioned, and aU history is linguistically 
co n d itio n ed .T h is  quote is taken from an article by KoseUeck in 1989 and 
sums up the essence of his philosophical foundation for historical writing. 
Language is a foundation for history, philosophy and politics, but for 
KoseUeck language is also the basis of society and societal stmctures. Post- 
linguistic turn historiography has joined the Kantian concepts of time and 
space with language as the three keystones of history. KoseUeck should, 
because of this, be considered a linguistic historian, but he has objections to a 
postmodem, linguistic terminology. Instead he considers himself to be part of 
the ‘conceptual tum’ that started in the eighteenth century. Concepts function 
in a discursive stmcture so even though KoseUeck is in strong opposition to 
stmcturalism, his conceptual history seems to be related to argumentation and 
discourse history.^ *^  ^Discourse analysis is connected to linguistic stmcturaUsm 
and not traditional historical stmcturaUsm.
A criterion of modernity are the concepts of movement that develop in 
this period as indices of social and poUtical change and also as Unguistic factors
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in the formation of consciousness, ideological criticism, and the control and 
management of behaviour
[Qoncepts have an internal temporal structure that differs from that o f  the 
events that they help to bring about and that they are supposed to 
comprehend. This result is also true o f  our m odem  concepts o f  m ovem ent 
that, since the eighteenth century, have attuned our entire linguistic inventory 
to the idea o f  the necessity o f  change, to alteration, and to intentional 
transformation. The central concepts are improvement, development, 
progress, history itself, reform, crisis, evolution, and even revolution. N o w  it 
is precisely these concepts that, purely semantically, exercise a particularly 
stabilizing e f f e c t .  4 6 8
In modernity, ot Neut^ eit, vocabulary starts to change and therefore Its concepts 
are no longer fixed ideas. As they change they are part of changing mentalities 
and society. Modernity is for Koselleck thus connected to the rise of ideologies 
and a different society. This can be dated firom the late eighteenth century. 
This process of conceptualisation has continued and we can stiU say we live in 
a conceptual age. In Prvu en t(mschen Reform und Revolution, Koselleck remarks 
that earlier historiography written by Ranke has stated that Prussia was a 
country that slowly grew to power, but Koselleck would rather argue that it 
was the changes into modernity that changed Prussia.^^  ^ This shows that 
Koselleck had an early interest in modernity.
Concepts can be seen as a collection of linguistic features that are tools 
that we can use to gtasp the experience o f time. Changes in concepts give us an 
indication of experience, as changes are more radical experiences than a 
stationary hfe. Concepts also carry meaning, which as a human construct also 
tells about the mentality. Conceptual history tries to make the experiences of 
time visible for the historian. These experiences of time are bound to our 
political and social essential concepts.
One example of how strong Koselleck believe concepts to be is his 
Critique and Crisis When Koselleck wrote this as a dissertation in the 1950s 
and when it was published in Germany in the 1960s, it was assumed to be an
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allusion to the Cold Wat. However, when the English edition came in 1988, 
Koselleck explains his real reasons:
This study is a product o f  the early postwar period. It represented an 
attempt to examine the historical preconditions o f  German National 
Socialism, w hose loss o f  reality and Utopian self-exaltation had resulted in 
hitherto unprecedented crimes. There was also the context o f  the cold war. 
Here, too, I was trying to enquire into its Utopian roots which, it seemed, 
prevented the two superpowers from simply recognizing each other as 
opponents. Instead they blocked one another and thereby destroyed the 
opportunity for a peace which each superpower self-confidently proclaimed 
to be capable o f  establishing sin^e-handedly. It was in  the Enlightenment, 
to which both liberal-democratic America and socialist Russia tightly 
retraced themselves, that I began to look for the com m on roots o f  their 
claim to exclusiveness with, its moral and philosophical le^timations.474
Koselleck believes that the reasons for National Socialism in Germany can be 
found in the conceptualisation process; that this process was so strong that it 
made political history. It is a tension between society and language that is the 
force behind ah history. ‘Social relations, conflicts, thek solutions, and thek 
changing presuppositions are never congruent with the linguistic articulation 
by which societies act, comprehend, interpret, change, and reform 
themselves.’^ ^^  Modem society was created by conceptualisation, but so was 
also National Socialism, Socialism and Liberalism and thus also conflicts on the 
expectations of the future.
Views of history and time are closely interlinked, but few historians 
take the time and effort to be interested in the philosophy of time. Koseheck 
found that the experience of time is not a constant, but has gone through the 
same conceptualisation as other concepts. He combines history and time to an 
investigation of the past and present. Futures Past is a book devoted to this sort 
of relationship, and Koselleck writes
I f  the whole o f  history is now  unique, then to be consistent, the past must 
be distinct from the present and the present from the future. In brief, the 
historicizing o f  history and its progressive exposition were at first to  sides 
o f  the same coin. History and Progress shared a com m on factor in the 
experience o f  a genuinely historical temporality.473
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Koselleck brings into historiography a new focus on the conceptualisation of 
time. Pocock has also written about the conceptualisation of time and what 
impact this has on historical understanding."'^ It was not a new thought that 
history was invented in what we call modernity. What is new with KoseUeck’s 
view is that there was a new kind of historical experience, or temporal 
experience that forced the development o f the past. Modernity has a new 
temporal understanding where the past and the future acquire new meanings 
and thus also new uses. It is unclear what KoseUeck means by experience — but 
this might be the natural ambiguity of a concept -  and this is a pity because 
this is the new thing he brings into temporal understanding. It is when the 
experience of time changes that history as an academic discipline come into 
being. The change is according to KoseUeck, the new beUef in progress,
‘History* as an effect o f modernity
Historiography developed in the nineteenth century due to conceptual 
changes. Foucault and KoseUeck agree that ‘history’ was created in the 
nineteenth century together with historical understanding and academic 
historiography."^ Historical writing was as old as Thucydides, but historical 
consciousness was created within the modern episteme. This influences how 
they both write historiography. None of them would Uke to be under the same 
constraints as those writing within the canon of traditional historical method. 
Instead they want a liberating science about the past; a discipline that can 
uncover structures created within society. Historiography is for KoseUeck a 
result of conceptual changes. The vocabulary in the eighteenth century must 
have changed quite radicaUy, but stiU slower than the political changes. 
KoseUeck does not question if it was possible for people to keep up with the 
language; if there became a division between people with a modem 
conceptualised vocabulary and people that had not heard these new ideas. 
Would people be aware that the words they used as a child had changed 
meaning in their adult years? Thomas Kuhn claims that a generation of
474 Pocock, p.39
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scientist have to die before a new paradigm can exist."*  ^Perhaps this is the case 
for Koselleck’s changes too; that the conceptualisation was something that 
changed with generations. Nevertheless, some changes happen quite rapidly. 
With the French Revolution, many political concepts did develop quickly. It is 
rather a question of how fast the old concepts needed to vanish. When the 
meaning of a concept no longer is in current use, one might assume they 
would die. Koselleck’s source material loosely seems to be political documents. 
He might have found a different speed of change if more varied sources had 
been investigated.
‘History’ is something that also goes through a conceptualisation in 
the nineteenth century. It is only with the modem understanding o f history 
that historical science becomes aware of its temporal location and then 
becomes the study of the past."^ Koselleck shows an interest in the 
conceptualisation of ‘history’ in German as the German language has two 
words, Geschichte and Historié, which had until the modem era been used 
interchangeably. The history o f this concept is interesting because it changes 
meaning and can also be seen as adapting its changing mental context, such as 
in the comprehension of experience:
The epistemological ambiguity o f  Kant's concept o f  experience, embracing 
both reality and its knowledge, finds a surprising analogy in the new  
concept “history” {(Geschichte), as it emerged at the same time. Since around 
1780 the concept “history”, hitherto only referring to  events, has absorbed 
the corresponding concepts o f  historiaF^
History was thus a child o f modernity and the combination of history and 
concepts might possibly be as old as the eighteenth century even though the 
discipline of Begriffsgeschichte is newer.
As mentioned above historical consciousness developed with the 
French Revolution. The traditional view has been that the historical 
consciousness of the nineteenth century was a consequence of the French 
Revolution. At the same time there is a growing belief in individuality which
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perhaps has roots in the Enlightenment German history can to a large extent 
be seen as something that the Germans became aware of as a means to find 
thek own identity. Germany had lost to Napoleon and then managed to throw 
him off; thus the Germans needed to look at German history to find thek 
roots. A long term reason for a historical consciousness lay in interest in 
language. It started with the interest in grammar, but then developed to include 
etymology and seeing how languages had grown. The development of 
languages proved that there had been progress, not a ckcular view of hktory. 
The new discipline of history differentiated between stories, legend, the past 
and history. ‘Experience is present past, whose events have be incorporated 
and can be remembered.’^ ^^  History was the knowledge of an alien esqjerience.
Begnffsgeschichte is dependent on a modem conceptual society — a society 
with a conceptual understanding, if not linguistic epistemology — and can 
therefore only be written about the last 300 years. This is because conceptual 
history is founded on the belief that language and discourse are factors that 
characteristically define a society. This is essential within linguistic 
epistemology. Concepts are indicators of change in language and thus also of 
change in society. The limitation of this knowledge is that this analysis only 
works on societies that have conceptual understanding. For Koselleck it is 
important to treat the historical object on its own terms and it is therefore 
difficult for him to look at pre-modem historiography because of its lack in 
historical understanding. Written sources from the pre-modern era cannot be 
adapted for historical understanding and facts wkl thus not be o f the same 
importance to us. We prefer to write historiography on our own premises. 
Perhaps it is Koselleck’s interest in temporality that has made him write history 
from the Enlightenment onwards only because he would Hke to converse with 
people that understand temporaUty in the same way as himself.
History is becoming depoHricised, perhaps due to what is considered 
post-modern attitude, and KoseUeck wants to claim history back into the 
poHtical sphere. Victor Gourevitch writes in the foreword to Critique and Crisis, 
that the reason why KoseUeck takes such an active poHtical view is because he 
views ‘the modern understanding of poHtics, and hence modem poHtical
479 KoseUeck (1985),p.272
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practice, [as having} become dangerously depoliticised’ Koselleck thus uses 
historiography for a pragmatic purpose. Kari Palonen continues this line of 
thought and argues that conceptual history can be an alternative style of 
political theorising. ‘Conceptual history offers a chance to tum the 
contestability, contingency and historicity o f the use of concepts into special 
instruments for conceptualizing politics.’*^  ^ Using historiography for a 
pragmatic purpose gives connotation to the pre-modem moral historiography, 
but Koselleck’s and Palonen’s writings imply a modem understanding of 
temporality which o f course distinguishes them from Enlightenment historical 
moralists. Instead, they are representative of the modem — and post-modern — 
academic pursuit of liberation through discovering truth behind the structures. 
Conceptual historiography can thus be normative without having to give up 
its academic pretension.
Historical time: past vs. future
With the modem age for the first time, an epistemological division 
between the entities of past and future emerged. Subsequently, the past has 
been considered slow and outdated and the future has hope, speed and 
progress. Experience for Koselleck is strictly connected to the relationship 
between past and future, and linked to the phenomenon of expectation for the 
future. Experience is of historical time, and is thus connected to temporality, 
but experience is something that only can be found through empirical research. 
However, historical experience is therefore not the same as historical facts. 
Koselleck writes:
jTEJexperience and expectation ate two categories appropriate for the 
treatment o f  historical time because o f  the way that tliey embody past and 
future. The categories are also suitable for detecting historical time in the 
domain o f  empirical research since, when substantially augmented, they 
provide guidance to concrete agencies in  the course o f  social and political
movement.482
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It seems as if he believes it is possible to use experience and expectation to 
understand the course of social and political movement. Perhaps many 
different experiences will be enough to create a full context. The differentiation 
of historical from nonhistorical, ahistorical, or andhistorical, is a feature of 
modernity. Before this epoch, there existed ideas about ‘history’ as inquiry, the 
past, temporality, remembrance and as a ihetorical genre. Koselleck believes 
historical temporality is a unique kind of temporality. Temporal extensions can 
always be described as experience (about the past) or expectation (about the 
future). Before modernity, experience and expectation were seen as 
symmetrical. However, with historicity in the modern society, expectation has 
become more important. There is a feeling that progress has accelerated. The 
past, i.e. history, becomes something different ftom the present and thus 
historical temporality becomes something different firom present temporality.
Koselleck sees historical temporality as something unique, and his 
views can be seen in contrast to other historians. Two interesting opposites are 
Foucault who would prefer historiography without temporality and Braudel 
who wrote about the plurality of times. The essence is, aU the same, that good 
historians need to reflect on time. The relationship between history and time 
developed with historiography as a modem discipline. I^ e rs  supports this 
view of the development in historiography as he comments upon temporality 
in Koselleck, Foucault and Braudel.
The historians w e have discussed have largely abandoned the idea o f  a 
linear, directional history, characteristic o f  much o f  historical thought since 
the period Reinhart K oselleck has described as the transition between about 
1750 and 1850 firom the prem odem  to the m odem  time. Michel Foucault 
considers the idea o f  one history to be an invention o f  m odem  times, which 
have already ended. M ost Annales historians would concur. In the place o f  
one historical time, they see a plurality o f  coexisting times, not only am ong  
different civilizations but also within each civilization.^®^
Koselleck’s project on time depends on his interest of modernity. He does not 
develop any temporal philosophy independent o f his historical observations of 
modernity. Koselleck’s theories are therefore valuable for historians working 
with modernity, but they do not challenge any philosophical theories o f time. 
This can be seen as a disadvantage of his theory; it does not try for a universal
485 Iggers, p.56
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effort. Both as a historian and a philosopher, Koselleck can best be understood 
in a modernist paradigm.
Foucault thought that he was writing purer history when temporal 
causation is removed, that he is able to show how things were experienced at 
the time. Foucault’s understanding of time and temporality is connected to his 
understanding of the past. Compared with Koselleck, Foucault does not make 
any important issue of the difference between time and temporality. Just as the 
past is something that exists objectively, time is something that can only be 
understood through human perception of temporality, and can only be grasped 
through human interpretation. When Foucault speaks about the fteezing of 
time in his earlier works, he does not really talk about time itself. He merely 
states that he wants to make a synchronic analysis of a discourse or episteme. 
Temporality is of no importance in archaeology, or rather it is important that 
time is taken away ftom history to make archaeology. Later temporality makes 
the change ftom one discourse to another. Koselleck is interested in how 
people experience temporality; this is of little interest for Foucault. He is more 
interested in how people experience their context at a fixed time, than in the 
development of it. Foucault took temporality out of history when he decided 
to see history as constructed by his epistemes. Foucault points out that there 
are no links between the epistemes whatsoever, so there is no such thing as 
historical development or a timeline. Epistemes supply sole continuity in the 
chaos of discontinuity.
Fernand Braudel talks about times', that things move at different speed 
and thus it is necessary to write the histories of all these levels. This is well 
described in The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Phillip II 
However, just as Foucault ‘treat[s] ‘history only to fteeze it’,^ ^^  Braudel also 
takes a close up view of just one period in time. Nevertheless, Braudel sees the 
necessity of seeing history as movement and development and thus manifests 
an interest in causation and temporaUty. Except for the lack of time, Foucault 
gives the impression that he has same interests as Braudel, but that he would 
like to carry out his research on a purely synchronic level. Since developments
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for Braudel happen with unequal speed and for Foucault spontaneously 
without continuity, the only possible way to capture the spirit o f some 
movement or historical phenomenon is to freeze time.
Historiography has tried to create systems of temporality that suit our 
experience of the past, which sometimes changes. KoseUeck describes this in 
his idea of the contemporaneous of the non-contemporary. This view believes 
in many different histories, not one Flistoty. The different histories have 
different tempos and rhythm. Time is a unique experience. In the 
understancling of history and temporality there are two major differences; 
events that can be narrated, and structures that can be described. We find 
once contemporary sources reliable — the accounts of eyewitnesses — and 
structures explanatory. Only events can take place in a temporal sequence. 
Structures take place in temporal relations, but not in a strict sequence.
Concepts not only teach us o f  the singularity (for us) o f  past meanings, but 
also contain structural potential, dealing with the contemporaneous in the 
noncontemporary, which cannot be reduced to the pure temporal 
succession o f  h i s t o r y .  4®6
The contemporary o f the non-contemporaneous is the relationship between 
events and structures. Events are once contemporary experience, while 
structures only are descriptions which never can be experienced or retold in 
narratives. There is a reciprocal relationship between events and structures 
where events only can be understood by structure and vice versa. ‘The 
transposition of once-direct experience into historical knowledge — even if it is 
an unexpected meaning released as the firagmentation of a past horizon of 
expectation gains recognition — is dependent upon a chronologically 
measurable sequence.’^ ®^ To narrate events or describe structures is it 
necessary to use historical concepts to make the past conceivable. Koselleck 
writes about temporal understanding as being constituted by experience and 
expectation. This makes historical understanding part o f the individual.
That ‘progress’, ‘citizen’, ‘nation’ or ‘freedom’ were ambiguous 
concepts, was something new, and thus what made ‘Modernity’ modem. Smce
4M KoseUeck (1985), p . l l3  
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concepts move through history at a different pace to ideas — faster, radical 
changes — modernity appears when experience and expectation partJ®  ^Earlier 
it was believed that expectation could be guided by experience. History was 
just the same experiences again and again. However, with modernity came the 
belief in progress and the possibility to expect changes. Expectation became 
linked to hope, something that had not been possible in a circular perception 
of history. Even the Christian salvation history had been based on a hope of 
something after life, not within history. Past experience changed value, and 
historiography changed, because it could no longer say anything about what to 
expect of the future. Concepts are what now make history conceivable as it is 
impossible to narrate an event, represent a structure or describe a process 
without the use of historical concepts. The history of the concept must be 
made explicit, so that the historian and the reader can compare the past with 
the present However, it seems that KoseUeck is interested only in concepts 
that have survived in some form today. Begriffsgeschichte can work only as a 
method with concepts within the modem age. A concept Uke ‘democracy’ is 
only a concept in modem times when it has its ambiguous meaning, while the 
word ‘democracy’ in ancient Greece had a fixed meaning to which democracy 
could be compared. However, it can be questioned if today’s ‘democracy’ has 
enough in common with the concept of ‘democracy’ that developed in the 
eighteenth century to make this exercise worthwhile. In contrast to Gadamer’s 
hermeneutic chain of tradition that makes interpretation possible, KoseUeck 
seem to have a more direct approach to past concepts.
‘Space of Experience’ and ‘Horizon of Expectation’ are two important 
concepts in KoseUeck’s philosophy o f history. Together they are what 
constitute the new temporal experience of modernity. ‘Experience’ and 
‘expectation’ claim the highest degree of ^neraUty, but they also claim an 
indispensable appUcation which makes them resemble the historical categories 
of time and space. ‘Space of experience’ and ‘horizon of expectation’ can be 
seen as meta-historical categories. Experience ‘is present past, whose events 
have been incorporated and be remembered’ and expectation ‘is the future 
made present: it directs itself to the not-yet, to the non-experienced, to that
488 ibid, p-276
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which is to be revealed/'®’ The horizon is the line behind which a new space of 
experience wiU open, but which cannot yet be seen. For KoseUeck it is 
important to point out that before modernity, experience and expectation were 
quite simUar, but with the progress in modernity, a historical change took place 
and hopes of accelerated progress were made for the future. As historians we 
thus have a different understanding of the past, than what we have of the 
present or future.
Koselleck in between past and future historiography
KoseUeck does not believe in postmodernism. Modernity and the 
modem age are thus defined by the conceptualisation process. Then how does 
that place our age? Jordheim writes that it is easy to argue that we now have 
left the modem era and entered the post-modern era because we do not have a 
general beUef iu progress any more and progress was just this defining concept 
of modernity.'’® He continues, however, to explain that KoseUeck stiU rejects 
the use of ‘postmodern’. KoseUeck has semantic reasons for this as the concept 
‘modern’ does have the function of always describing what has happened most 
recently, in contrast to what has happened earUer. Hence, the concept ‘modem’ 
wiU always iuclude the eradication of itself. ‘Postmodem’ wUl for KoseUeck 
thus be a tautology, and the concept of ‘postmodernism’ has as its main 
purpose iu justifying an ideology.'’' However, it does not matter if KoseUeck 
does not beUeve in the concept ‘postmodern’, he stUl does not explain if he 
believes we are in a different era form what we normaUy caU modem age, i.e. 
the long’ nineteenth century. KoseUeck does sometimes talk o f eras or periods, 
but it is not clear what he means by that. Rather he seems to assume that since 
the conceptualisation process started we have been in a ‘conceptual age’, a sort 
of Unguistic episteme, that we are stiU a part of. Periods are rather shorter time 
spans, e.g. decades under one ruler or similar. However, periods, epistemes or 
paradigms do not seem to be of importance for KoseUeck’s historiography.
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outside the pre-modem/modem division. The context surrounding a concept 
does not need a name, just a description and understanding.
The interdisciplinary and erudite pretensions of Begnffsgeschichte make 
Koselleck look like a modem man with old-fashioned visions. His interest is in 
making a synthesis of many different academic disciplines that in fact examine 
the same thing and joining them in one specialised field of Begnffsgeschichte. This 
seems to be in contrast to what happens in other disciplines where a 
specialisation is rather a narrowing of the field. Begnffsgeschichte is more of a 
classical erudite discipline where a great historical knowledge and a wide 
methodological understanding are needed. Koselleck also breaks with the 
tradition of keeping history a ‘pure’ discipline by their readiness to introduce a 
more social-scientific approach to history in addition to the more philological 
methodology. He has a vague notion of relativism, but the rest of his beUef is 
strongly founded on modernist values. The way Koselleck states that 
postmodernism does not exist is just a fact that points out that he has not been 
influenced by postmodernist theories and that he does not care to refute those 
ideas. Koselleck might have started a new conceptual discourse that can start 
something new, perhaps even a new philosophy of history, but as a practitioner 
Koselleck just continued the work of his countrymen.
For Koselleck society and concepts are something that developed at 
the same time in the late eighteenth century. Social history and conceptual 
history thus both have a common history and are both offspring of modernity. 
Koselleck does not challenge earlier interpretations of the past. He only gives 
new reasons for these interpretations. Thus he offers a theoretical shift rather 
than a disciplinary change. ‘The measurement and investigation o f differences 
among or convergence of old concepts and modern cognitive categories is 
performed by Begnffsgeschichte. To this extent, Begnffsgeschichte — however varied 
its own methods and apart from its actual empirical yield — is a kind of 
propaedeutic for a historical epistemology.’' ’  ^It is more the epistemology than 
the discipline itself that is new with Koselleck’s Begnffsgeschichte.
452 KoseUeck (1985), p.268
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6 Histoiy of concepts as a critical philosophical attitude: 
Michel Foucault
Foucault in an important sense replaced M arx as the analyst of power and of the relation to 
knowledge}^ ^
Michel Foucault was a historian, a philosopher and a critic of society 
who used history of concepts as a critical tool. The fact that it is difficult to 
categorise him as either philosopher or historian is part of the interdisciplinary 
way of thinking that IrmeHne Veit-Brause finds characteristic for the history of 
concepts. Even if Foucault is seldom characterised as a historian of concepts 
— and that he might have found the characterisation a bit strange — he seems to 
fit nicely in with the wish KoseUeck had for Begnffsgeschichte to be a critical and 
philosophical historical discipline. Koselleck claimed that history and 
philosophy together were the best forms of understanding. He wrote that Tast 
facts and contemporary judgement are, within the practice of investigation, the 
terminological poles which correspond to objectivity and partiality in 
epistemology’.'’® This chapter will try to show that Foucault’s combination of 
historian, philosopher and critic by a linguistic approach was very compatible 
with the histories-of-concepts approach, and that Foucault used conceptual 
investigation as a means of critique.
History, archaeology of knowledge and genealogy
The radical difference between Foucault’s way of writing history — or in 
his own terms archaeology of knowledge — and traditional contemporary 
historiography, was that Foucault brought morality and politics back into 
historiography. He stUl undertook objective research to the extent that was
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possible, since all texts are influenced by the linguistic discourse in which they 
find themselves. Foucault was able to show that not everything had become 
clearer thanks to previous historiography; some ideas had been suppressed.
Foucault wanted to become the liberator of suppressed ideas. This is the 
reason why Foucault was not interested in what has been done previously.
Enough historiography from the suppressors’ point of view has been written.
Foucault thought we needed a liberated version. Ideally all approaches should 
be presented together to give a fuller perspective of the truth. Unfortunately,
Foucault was too concerned with the liberated view that he forgot other ways 
of seeing things. It was not what he investigated, but his methods, that 
Foucault claimed to be new; archaeology of knowledge, genealogy and lastly, 
history as ethics. The archaeology and its archives are new ways of looking at j
the past, but the method used to acquire knowledge about the past was not |
necessarily new. Criticisms of Foucault that he was too personal are answered {
by Blanchot who emphasises that Foucault was a serious historian and that |
even in The History of sexuality lie  was to compose on subjects so intimate to jihim are ostensibly books of a studious historian rather than works of personal |
inquiry.’' ’® i
Foucault can be classified as a historian because he wrote about the 
past. This does not necessarily make him a difficult theorist. Like all historians 
he had a certain agenda, but mostly he was a historian of concepts working 
with concepts synchronically and diachronically in the past and in connection 
both with the past and the present. To this extent his work must be seen to 
have some similarities with that of Koselleck. Foucault wrote a history of 
concepts where principles were very important. The author should ask 
questions of the texts, not only to interpret, but to understand more of human 
nature. It depends perhaps on what we want Foucault to be. O’Farrell 
mentions this difference in opinions on what Foucault was:
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English-speaking critics feel that they have to prove that Foucault is a 
philosopher rather than som ething else. T he French, who have a broader 
conception o f  what constitutes a suitable material for philosophy, do not 
put themselves to  aU this trouble, and those w ho describe him  as a 
philosopher do not consider it is necessary to  prove this classification. On  
the other hand, English-speaking critics are m ore willing to describe him as 
a historian — even i f  a som ewhat unorthodox one.^^^
While the British only later found him to be an unorthodox historian, he was 
welcomed as a historian by the French established milieu when his first book 
came out. Femand Braudel praised ¥olie et déraison : Histoire de la folie à Vâge 
classique^ ^^  in Annales: économies, sociétés, civilisations}^  ^ Thus, if it has been 
questioned later if Foucault really was a historian, it was not questioned at the 
time.
It seems as if historians are not comfortable with his rigid categories 
and that they correspond badly with other historical realities. Roth explains 
how extreme this critique has been: 'Foucault's critical history can be portrayed 
as an antihistory because it is attempting to make the present into past which 
we leave behind, and not into a history which we tighdy embrace as our own, 
Hayden Wliite’s term for this project, a 'Wriremembrance of things past,” is an 
accurate one.’^ ®^
This view  o f  Foucault as an extreme idealist portrayed as antihistorian, goes 
too far. Foucault creates new  structures, but none without a 
historiographical foundation. Foucault’s new  structures in intellectual 
history can be compared to Braudel’s ow n new  structures in econom ic 
history. Foucault makes acknowledgement, in addition to the Annates 
School, to Georges Dum ézil, historian o f  religion and Canguilhem, 
historian o f  science. 201
The history of science may nevertheless have been his main source of 
inspiration as there are mechanisms he is looking for, but which he assumes 
are closed because they were restricted in the discourse.
Although Foucault was disappointed by the lack of attention when he 
first published, his works became known later; especially after the success of
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Les Mots et les choses. Three distinct groups of French writing came into 
existence in its wake: The first consisted of intellectuals such as Sartre, Aron, 
Barthes, Serres and Canguilhem. Then came critique from Marxists, 
existentialist and firom established psychiatrists. Last were the ‘secondary' 
intellectuals; journalist writing intellectual “gossip columns''-^®  ^ The general 
tendency made historians curious about Foucault's new method of writing, or 
if not his writing, then at least the question he asked. Nilsson writes that 
Foucault has made a good impact on historiography, making it more self- 
critical. After Foucault, it has been necessary to ask questions such as: Within 
which discourse is my work? Which powers are legitimate through my work as 
a histotiani^^^
In contrast to everyone that criticises the fact the Foucault was a too 
original historian, Munslow encourages us to see Foucault as a different kind 
of historian; a deconstructionist historian:
In spite o f  his assault on  the epistemology o f  traditional history, like all 
historians (including deconstructionist historians) Foucault accepts the need  
to study the evidence in the archive. The essential proviso is that history’s 
facts are understood primarily as the epistemic discursive creations both o f  
people in the past and o f  the historian, written as the relationship the 
historian believes exists between words and things in any episteme h e/sh e  
studies. This means that h is/h er understanding o f  the data results from, 
and can only be revealed in, h is/her com posed or invented narrative which  
itself ultimately a function o f  the tropic structure o f  his/her ow n age.204
Munslow, however, is the historian behind the concept of deconstructionist 
historiography, and he uses Foucault for extreme philosophical purposes.
Foucault was a linguistic historian and saw the importance of language 
as a bridge between the past and us. In Madness and Civilisation he writes:
As for a com m on language, there is no such thing; there is no such thing 
any longer; the constitution o f  madness as a mental illness, at the end o f  the 
eighteenth century, affords the evidence o f  a broken dialogue, posits the 
separation as already effected, and thrusts into oblivion all those 
stammered, imperfect words without fixed syntax in which the exchange
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203 N ilsson, Roddy; ‘D en  narvarande firânvaron eller i vantn pa Foucault: En diskussion om  
Foucault och den svenska historic disciplinen.’[The Present Absence or Waiting for Foucault: 
A  Discussion o f  Foucault and the Swedish Historiography] in Historisk Tidsskrift [Sweden] 
(2000), p.205
204 Munslow, p. 126
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between madness and reason was made. The language o f  psychiatry, which  
is a m onologue o f  reason about madness, has been established only on  the 
basis o f  such a silence. I have n o t tried to write the history o f  that language, 
but rather the archaeology o f  that silence. 20^
The archaeology of silence turns out to be the archaeology of languages which 
is not psychiatric, but which still talks of madness. In The Order of Things 
Foucault writes: ^Languages, though imperfect knowledge themselves, are the 
faithful memory of the progress of knowledge towards p e r f e c t i o n . I t  is a 
work of a combination of time and word. Clifford compares this to Hegel's 
writing, and writes that Foucault saw
him self as engaged in the writing o f  a “history o f  the present,” not o f  the 
past. Perhaps this is because he tacitly recognized that any written history 
could not be a re presentation o f  the past, but is in fact a m om ent o f  
ordinarily presentation — that written history is itself an inscription o f  
temporal space.
This collapses the distinction between time and word, and this is why Clifford 
thinks it is possible to compare Foucault’s view of the past with Hegel’s view 
of history as the privilege of man as both maker and writer of history.
Critical methodology of the past
It is the methodologies of archaeology of knowledge and genealogy 
that can be seen as being methodologies of conceptual history. ‘Archaeology 
describes discourses as practices specified in the element of the archive.’ 
Flynn makes an important point:
Foucault’s first major works were ‘archaeologies’ o f  madness, clinical 
medicine, and the social sciences, respectively. Rather than study the 
‘arche,’ origin, these archaeologies examine the ‘archive,’ by which he  
means “system that establish statements (énoncés) as events (with their own  
conditions, domain o f  appearance) and as things (with their own possibility 
and filed o f  use)”.209
205 Foucault, Michel, Madness and Civilisation. (London: Routledge Classics, 2001), p.xii
206 Foucault (2002 I), p.96
207 Clifford, Michael; “Hegel and Foucault: Toward a History Without Man” in Clio\ Fall 1999; 
29,1 pp.21-2
208 Foucault, (2002II), p .148
209 Flynn, p.29 Flynn’s definition o f  the archive is taken from Foucault’s The Archaeology of 
Ktiomledge, p. 128
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Genealogy is the method that studies origins. Foucault wrote this about the 
archive:
Between the language (langue) that defines the system o f  constructing 
possible sentences, and the corpus that passively collects the words that are 
spoken, the archive defines a particular level: that o f  a practice that causes 
multiplicity o f  statements to emerge as so many regular events, as so many 
things to be dealt w ith and manipulated. It does not have the weight o f  
tradition; and it does not constitute a library o f  all libraries, outside time 
and place; nor does it in the welcom ing oblivion that opens up to all new  
speech the operational field o f  its fireedom; between tradition and oblivion, 
it reveals the rules o f  practice that enables statements both to survive and 
to undergo regular modification. It is the general ystem of the formation and 
trandormation of statements. 2to
Archaeology is uncovering layers and already while writing his second 
dissertation on Kant, Foucault uses this methodology and describes it as 
underlying geology.^" ‘Archaeology’ is a science collecting facts about the past. 
It is objective and lets the objects speak for themselves. Archaeology of 
knowledge aims to attach utterances to the appropriate discourse, just as more 
traditional archaeology locates objects in a stratum. Compared with history, 
archaeology looks at different sources. While a historian would use descriptive 
and explanatory sources, an archaeologist of knowledge uses primary sources 
not necessarily discussing the period itself, but just any topic, and thus 
interprets between the lines. Foucault was critical o f he traditional 
historiographer here, as primary sources and interpretation are also part of 
their work. However, Foucault shocked other historians by his choice of 
source material. Foucault claimed that archaeology was a more pure form of 
historiography than history, because one is looking directly at past discourse, 
not through the eyes of someone who is part of this discourse. The 
archaeologist has a more objective attitude to the past than a person writing 
contemporary history. Foucault does not think it necessary to get rid of history 
in favour of archaeology, but these two disciplines have to work side by side.
However, while Flynn here refers to Foucault’s emphasis on the focus 
on events, Bknchot includes ‘events’ in concepts that Foucault would oppose.
210 Foucault ( 2 0 0 2 II) p .l46
211 Eribon, p .llO
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[By T h e  Order o f  the discourse’] Foucault proposed event, series, regularity, 
and condition o f possibility as the notion he would use to  oppose, term by 
term, those principles he thought had dominated the traditional history o f  
ideas; event was opposed to creation, series to unit, regularity to originality, 
and conditions o f  possibility to  m e a n i n g s . 2 1 2
Foucault was very interested in Nietzsche and especially his Genealogy of Morals. 
This inspired Foucault’s article ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’. ‘Genealogy’ is 
thus not a new concept from Foucault but something he develops from 
Nietzsche.
With the shift to the ‘genealo^cal’ m ethod and a more explicit concern 
with the theory o f  power, Foucault’s conception o f  the other is significantly 
altered. The other is no longer conceived as a shadowy, contestatory force 
on  the margins o f  society, but as an effect o f  the power relations that 
permeate the social realm. 2i3
Genealogy is diachronic research through the past with one object in mind to 
find the roots of a modem phenomenon. To some extent this can be seen as 
the method of Begriffsgeschichte by following one concept or institution through 
history. What Nietzsche found, and Foucault after him, was that the roots of a 
phenomenon can be totally different firom how the phenomenon is perceived 
today. Nietzsche found that our concept of morals is based on a Christian way 
of coping with being the underdog. In die same way, Foucault found that this 
perception of sexuality has roots that are quite corrupted, and it is no longer 
the same concept as found in antiquity. Thus, we should no longer pretend it 
to be the same concept. The concepts change through its encounters with 
different discourses. Genealogy is a discipline that shows us that history is not 
necessarily what we think it to be. It is clear that because meanings change 
through history, we do have to understand the discourses to be able to 
understand the past.
Concepts are related in epistemes. They have meaning dependent on 
clusters of which they are members. Foucault has not looked at political 
concepts, but he has looked at how general concepts create power. Concepts 
have power to the extent that they are part of creating a discourse, but 
Foucault would say that it is the discourse that forms the concepts rather than
2^ 2 Blanchot, p.76 
213 McNay, p.6
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the other way round. Just as sciences are Hnked more by their belonging to an 
episteme than to their discipline equivalent in other epistemes, the meaning of 
a concept will have more in common with other concepts in the same episteme 
then with its “identity” through history. This is why both archaeology and 
genealogy are important; one speaks of the concept from a synchronic 
perspective, and the other from a diachronic perspective.
Foucault can be classified as a contextualist because of his discourse 
analysis. Perhaps Foucault did not use the word context, but instead uses 
words like discourse, archive and episteme, because they are limited contexts. 
Foucault seems to be very interested in limits, and when context is limited, 
they become a boundary rather than a possibility. These limits make historical 
interpretation easier because what to look for is defined. In L ’ordre de 
discoursf^ "^ , his inaugural lecture to the College de France, Foucault sees the 
academic life as having these same boundaries of excluding a large part of the 
population. To a large extent, the mentality o f the whole population must be 
the context in which the discourse is. The context is something to which all the 
units in the discourse are relative and thus must traditionally be seen as 
something fixed. The discourse, however, is a living object. Discourses as such 
are not a tool for Foucault, They are a study in themselves. However, they 
carry the historical understanding for which Foucault is looking Foucault used 
discourses as a means to understand the mentality of a period. The mentality 
and the discourse can be seen as one. Perhaps it is right to categorise Foucault 
as an historian of discourses, as Koselleck would be an historian of concepts. It 
is a tool for understanding, but it is also the main focus of investigation as they 
have meanings in themselves.
Looking at Foucault’s thoughts as an expression for our discourse 
would parallel his view of looking at other historical works.^^  ^ The French 
intellectual environment that Foucault worked in was shaped by French 
interest in Marxism and, in history, this meant the influence of the Annales 
School. Foucault himself was also influenced by the Annales even though he, 
according to Munslow, later became strongly anti-positivist and anti-empMcaL
214 Foucault, Michel, Diskursens orden: tiltredelsesforeksning hold ved College de France 2. desember 1970 
translation by Espen Schaanning (Oslo: Spartacus, 1999)
213 N ilsson, p. 197
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This Annaliste influence stimulated a life-long constructionist desire to discover 
collective cultural practices.^^  ^ At the same time there was, according to 
O ’Farrell, a natural change in historical understanding in 1960s France: France 
felt like an outsider because it felt it had lost its historical mission. 
Technological and human sciences progressed rapidly as a new consumer age 
began.^^  ^It is obvious that Foucault’s thought has been considered as running 
against this tradition. He never taught history, but rather a diversity of 
philosophical and psychological topics, where he used the past to find 
examples. He broke with the tradition o f usmg historiography for pure political 
and societal explanations.
Foucault distinguishes himself fcom other structuralists by his 
understandiug of the past. Foucault has a defragmented view of the past; by 
way of example he neither believes in History nor histories, but in units of 
discourse. This is emphasised with a focus on the discontinuity within history. 
When in Les Mots et les choses he writes about the disciplines of economics, 
biology and grammatology, he does not see a continuous history that can be 
viewed as a progress towards what these disciplines are today. Instead he sees 
discourses at a given time discussing the same sort of questions even though 
they may be in different discipHnes. There is a definitive break between the 
different discourses. Yet Foucault is less and less austere about these 
discontinuities. The epistemes are theories that he values strictly in the 
beginning of his scholarship, but later he is more open to developments and 
progress. The defiagmentation must be seen as something different fi:om 
structuralism. Structuralists usually look for continuous structures that can 
explain a total history, Foucault is more concerned with synchronic structures. 
The discourses are synchronic structures that must be seen as layers if one 
views history as a line. These layers are not necessarily linked to each other, but 
are separated by regularities and language,
Foucault is known as the discontinuity historian, because his episteme 
theory states that history is not a continuous string of events, but one episteme
21^  Munslow, pp. 130-1 
212 O ’Farrell, p.6
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after another where ideas do not continue into the new episteme. O ’Farrell 
writes this about discontinuity:
|T]he basis o f  Foucault’s historiogtaphy was a principle o f  discontinuity (the 
methodological equivalent o f  the limit), a discontinuity which also underlay 
his political and ethical views. This principle, however, changed 
considerably in appearance throughout his career. Beginning with 
discontinuity on  a large historical scale, discontinuity shrank to a smaller and 
smaller scale to re-emerge in a highly complex series o f  transformations. In 
the 1970s he changed the entire focus o f  his discussion on discontinuity 
from the arrangement o f  historical events and ‘discourse’ to the larger 
arrangement o f  ‘theory’, ‘power’, and the role o f  the intellectual. By this 
stage, the particles o f  discontinuity had becom e so  fine as to almost produce 
tlie effect o f  continuity.2^ ^
All the same, as O’Fatrell writes, his view changes to become more and more 
continuous. So even if the archaeology is a historical view based on 
discontinuity, genealogy is not. In genealogy, is it necessary to believe that ideas 
have a continuous development to be able to find the root of a concept. The 
concept of change does not have an important place in Foucault’s ideas. 
Traditional historians are interested in change, but Foucault is more interested 
in looking at the stationary. Historians normally look at change because that is 
where one can find the answers to what was and what comes, in addition to a 
time of change often highlight features o f a society. As Foucault does not 
believe in gradual change, he cannot find the same sort of change. Change is 
the stage between one episteme or discourse and another. However, this stage 
does not exist; or rather it is extremely short. The change ftom one episteme to 
another is not gradual but sudden. It is not clear ftom Foucault what triggers 
these changes. When Foucault writes historiography he still needs his own 
ideas to form a coherent set. To be able to show discontinuity he must believe 
in the concept of continuity and coherence. Chaos cannot be described 
without order.
History of concepts as philosophy
When trying to determine whether Foucault was a historian or a 
philosopher we should bear in mind Maurice Blanchot’s words:
218 ibid., p.47
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What seems to be the difficult — and privileged — position o f  Foucault 
might be the following: do w e know w ho he is, since he doesn’t call him self 
(he is on a perpetual slalom course between traditional philosophy and the 
abandonment o f  any pretension to seriousness) either a sociologist or a 
historian or a structuralist or a thinker or a metaphysicianP^i®
Foucault was a thinker who influenced many disciplines in the second half of 
the twentieth history. It has always been difficult to place him within one 
defined discipline, and this probably pleased him. He has been used within 
literary theory, sociology, queer theory, psychology amongst other fields. It is 
therefore easy to criticise him for being more of a philosopher than an 
historian. As McNay mentions: These literary and historical studies are, in 
turn, informed by philosophical reflection and the nature of rationality, truth 
and power, and on what it means to be an individual in modem society.’^ *^^ He 
is right to assert that no matter what Foucault’s object is, there wÜl always be a 
philosophical foundation on which to commence. Flynn goes even further and 
claims that Foucault’s historical method can be most easily compared to a 
philosophical style.
History and politics are linked in Foucault to die extent that he 
understands that other historians are political as well. Foucault was 
disappointed that his books at first did not create a greater political impact, 
however, this changed in later years. Foucault is also aware o f how closely 
Marxism and history were linked in France when he started writing. It is 
unclear if Foucault believes it is an advantage that history and politics have a 
close relationship. It must be seen as a disadvantage as the power structures 
rule history, but rather Foucault states that this is the way it is. The advantage 
must be that all historians have the same possibility to make a political impact. 
Foucault himself, indeed, wished to make an impact with his writing. As 
Foucault was a historian on the verge of philosophy and political science, his 
historiography might not qualify as being placed with more traditional 
historiography, but the same fact rules for all historians. Foucault’s historical 
writing is also very rektivistic and some criteria will necessarily be needed to 
make criteria for the choosing of writing; these choices wUl be political.
219 Blanchot, p.93
220 McNay, p .l
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Foucault probably thought it best to be aware of the political viewpoint held by 
an author.
Just as history is linked to politics, it is also linked to philosophy. The 
past becomes one way of understanding humans, just as philosophy is. 
Foucault dealt with philosophy all his Hfe, but wrote historical books. For him 
it was just the way of explaining human action. Nevertheless, the reason why 
Foucault has been criticised for being more a philosopher than a historian is 
because he used history for a purpose. Perhaps it is because he was connected 
to history of mentalities that Foucault is difficult to categorise between 
philosophy and history. He plays and active part iu his histories as he took 
sides iu what he wrote; he was both a philosopher and a historian. It was not 
one of Foucault’s goals to be objective, as that is impossible. Foucault was not 
afraid to ask moral questions, and to answer them. It seems that he regretted 
other historians not doing the same.
Although Foucault was a historian, he used his work for contemporary 
purposes. He always wanted to make an impact with his writer; just as a 
philosopher. However, his writing does not have the same purpose as 
historical and moral Enlightenment writing. Foucault was more a personal 
writer, than a political writer. When Foucault classified his writing in three 
stages, he described them as archaeology, genealogy and ethics. All of these 
approaches must be seen as having a contemporary foundation. They are 
pragmatic historical writing, written for a contemporary audience to make an 
impact. When he wrote the archaeologies he claimed to be true to the past, but, 
in his later works, the past seemed to become more and more of a tool and the 
contemporary aspect becomes more and more important. Genealogy is written 
to explain the present, and the ethical historiography is written to understand 
the world in an ethical way. The past and art are disciplines to be studied to get 
to know mankind better.
Gutting comments that Foucault did not seem to Hve up to his own 
standards: ‘For it seems that archaeology claims to be precisely the sort of 
neutral, ahistorical theoretical knowledge to which Foucault’s later
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philosophical project allows no p lace /^  Perhaps Gutting is right that Foucault 
was more of a philosopher than he intended. Foucault sets out to be a theorist 
based on contextualism, but then he became interested in the theoretical. 
Gutting seems, nonetheless, to draw parallels between the neutral and the 
ahistorical yet Foucault did not do that. Foucault looked for a neutral 
foundation, not based on traditional historical understanding, but one that is 
not ahistorical The neutrality of the archaeological method is based on looking 
at objects independent of progress and development; i.e. without time, but it is 
historical because it is part o f a historical context to which it needs to be seen 
to belong and which and which is necessary for a understanding of the 
meaning.
Foucault as a critical postmodernist
As Foucault saw it, he past had been misused. History had been used to 
explain things that were not necessarily morally acceptable. History had given 
legitimacy. History had also been misunderstood because historians had failed 
to see the heart of discourses. A Linguistic understanding was necessary to 
understand mentality, but mentality had not yet been considered important 
before the linguistic turn. Perhaps it is possible to say that Foucault did a 
conceptual or linguistic turn within structuralist historiography. The past can 
only be properly understood if we try to understand the mentality behind it. 
This is an attempt at pure history, but Foucault puts ideology into it himself. In 
his later works he criticises history and historical understanding as a form that 
gives and secures power. It had thus far been the ruling classes that wrote 
history and therefore have a power-historiography been written. Foucault 
wants to show the history of the powerless. The past must have some value in 
itself, but not in a historicist understanding of it. As Foucault saw it, history 
has never been able to teU the truth; therefore is it important to invent this new 
discipline of archaeology of knowledge, which wiU dig to present facts, but 
then be honest with the story it tells. The archaeologist of knowledge digs in 
the archives to discover the different levels of discourses.
222 Gutting, Gary: Michel Foucault's archaeology o f scientific reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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Historical time for Foucault is a structure rather than an experience. 
Historical time is where one finds historical objects. In the same way that a 
traditional archaeologist works with a period, Foucault works with a discourse. 
For him ‘period’ is a mistaken classification: one should look for the 
mechanism which defines a period and he would therefore call it a discourse, 
or the overall episteme. Historical time is to some extent non-existent. The 
past is no longer a living organism, but rather a dead text. Archaeology is like 
working with the same passage of the text finding its meaning and thus 
understanding the single word. Genealogy, on the other hand, is like looking 
through the whole text, searching for traces of a word/ concept and find when 
it was first mentioned. It might be a linguistic turn that made Foucault treat the 
past as a text, as language is a structure that can most easily be interpreted 
while in a text. Historical time is thus abandoned to give easier access to 
interpretations of the concepts that are necessary for historical understanding.
Despite Foucault’s removal of historical time, thus making duration of 
little importance, sequence and coherence are still important; perhaps even 
more important than in traditional hritoriography because sequence is an 
important structure. Sequence is what makes a system in a genealogy and also 
what puts meaning in a discourse. A discourse is a coherent set of thoughts, 
and a genealogy is a coherent sequence of development. For Foucault, 
however, it is not necessary to include temporality to make a context coherent.
Structuralism has founded a classical opposition to historism. Foucault 
was a part of the linguistic turn in the way that he was very much influenced by 
structuralism. He never agreed to bemg either a structuralist or a post­
structuralist: he did not like classifications as they are limiting. However, being 
in a structuralist tradition, he valued the structures found in language, as the 
possibilities and limitations that languages create, but he was also inspired by 
structuralist historians like the AnnaHste School, who look at economic and 
political structures in a wider picture than event history. Foucault was 
influenced by new ways of writing histories of science and mentalities, and he 
started by looking at the history of madness and psychiatry. It is also obvious 
that he was influenced by his philosophical knowledge. He made a translation 
o f Kant and argued that Kantian thoughts must be seen as prerequisites for the
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linguistic turn. The ‘linguistic turn’ was not a concept that Foucault uses, but 
his kind o f structuralism must be seen as part of it.
Munslow is of the opinion that Foucault must be seen as part of the 
post-modem condition as his writing as it ‘lays open the figurative and 
narrative strategies that authorise their conceptualizations, to reveal what 
Hayden White calls the deep structure of their linguistic protocols — the 
tropes.’^  This historical understanding has given up the possibility o f grasping 
original truth. Foucault did not want to be categorised as postmodernist.
[Foucault] claimed not to  understand what problem(s) the term modernity 
represented, since in relation to it he was presumed to  be either a 
postmodernist or antimodernist and he did not regard him self as either one. 
Rather, he saw liim self as a modernist, where modernism is understood as 
more o f  an attitude than a historical period, as “a permanent critique o f  our 
historical era” in the pursuit o f  enlightenment.224
All the same, Foucault would suit the definition of post-modemity that 
Bauman uses, where the role of the analytical strategy used is that of the 
interpreter. Yet, Bauman adds
Instead o f  being orientated towards selecting the best social order, this 
strategy is aimed at facilitating communication between autonomous 
(sovereign) participants. [...] It is vitally important to note that the post­
modern strategy does not imply the elimination o f  the modern one; on the 
contrary, it cannot be conceived without the continuation o f  the l a t t e r .  2 2 5
So Foucault is right iu feeling like a modernist even though he is part of the 
post-modern. Foucault’s history is modem in its focus on system and 
structures, but his historical understanding and the way he looks at the past is 
fragmented and post-modern.
Foucault did not believe in progress in history. Perhaps this is what 
most clearly does not make him a modernist. Changes and developments have 
happened in history, but not necessarily for the better. Things are relative to 
their context. Moreover things that were appreciated earlier might not be 
appreciated any longer. There are two main points to Foucault’s thoughts: one
223 M unslow p .l21
224 Kelly, Michael; ‘Inttoduction’ in Critique and Power. Recasting the Foucault!Habermas Debate ed. 
M.Kelly (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), p.3
225 Bauman, p.5
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linked to archaeology and the other to genealogy. Archaeology shows that 
sciences have not developed fcom the Enlightenment to the present day. They 
were in a different discourse and had other aims with their “scientific” 
approach. In genealogy it is clear fcom the phenomena that Foucault 
investigates whether our society might have developed more problems rather 
than the opposite. Perhaps there has been positive technological progress, but 
psychologically or morally we might have had a bad development. As Coe 
writes ‘Genealogy instead exposes the contingency of past events, and the 
fragmentation of self-consciousness.’ The changes in history have been 
caused by power and thus not always for the reasons of progress. However, 
the people in power will always claim that they are making progress; at least 
people fcom modernity onwards. In Foucault’s view it should be possible to 
have progress within smaller disciplines, and for a shorter amount of time, but 
there are no overall progress in history.
In The Order of Things, Foucault wrote that he sets out to write about the 
experience of order and its modes of being.^^ The context is probably defining 
the experience a person has, both today and previously. The discourse shapes 
the experience it is possible to have. The experience of the past can only be 
gcasped through collective mentality studies. However, Andersen dahns that 
Foucault could be interested in true experience, because to ‘Foucault there is 
only one level, which is that of appearance. Foucault focused on the statements 
as they emerge, as they come into being. It is crucial to him never to reduce 
them to something else.’^ ®
Perhaps it is not possible totally to understand the experience o f the 
past, no matter how much the historic mentality is investigated. Foucault wrote 
his books because of experiences he had had in his own Hfe; he did not then 
expect people to understand his experiences, but understand the thought he 
managed to write fcom this experience. Perhaps he thus did not beHeve any 
exchange of experience is possible, neither between people within a discourse, 
nor between people in different discourses. To be interested in the experience
226 Coe, Cynthia D .; ‘Dom esticating Time: Tw o Contemporary Continental Critiques o f  
History’ in Clio 30:4 2001, p.429 222 Foucault ( 2002 I), p.xxiii
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of the people in the past seems to imply historism. Since Foucault was 
interested in the past for his personal and contemporary reasons, he cannot 
really be interested in experience. When it comes to a present experience of the 
past; Foucault believes that this experience did not necessarily portray a true 
picture.
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Conclusion
This dissertation has tried to show that the study of concepts has been 
important in historiography after the linguistic turn. For all its important 
contribution to historiography, it is a methodology that has much unused 
potential Concepts have in the linguistic turn revealed that ‘if we wish to grasp 
how someone sees the world — what distinctions they draw, what classifications 
they draw, what classification they accept — what we need to know is not what 
words they use but rather what concepts they possess.’^ ^ The study of 
concepts has not always been related to an identity as a conceptual historian As 
many have rightly connected history of concepts with Begrffsgeschiehte, not all 
historians who have worked with concepts but not felt attached to this 
German discipline have defined themselves as conceptual historians. Followers 
o f Begriffsgeschichte have made the history of concepts into a growing discipline 
of analysis of political and social concepts. Another clear discipline of history 
o f concepts is the style o f historiography written or inspired by Foucault, for 
instance Stuart Clark and Erling Sandmo. Foucault was very determined not to 
write traditional history of ideas and instead he worked on a deeper level of 
meaning. This made him conscious of his focus on concepts. In contrast are 
the historians that have written social, cultural or gender history, perhaps even 
inspired by Foucault, but have not deliberately worked on concepts; to these 
people the methodology has merely shown itself to be a helpful approach. In 
particular, gender historians and social historians working on ‘class’ have been 
focused on the concept they have studied to such an extent that they have 
forgotten that it is a concept, even though they have analysed it both 
linguistically and conceptually.
229 Skinner (2002), p .l59
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Intellectual history has been influenced by what Skinner famously 
wrote in 1969; that
no agent can eventually be said to have meant or done something which he 
could never have brought to accept as a correct description o f  what he had 
meant or done. This special authority o f  an agent over his intentions does 
not exclude, o f  course, the possibility that an observer might be in a 
position to  give a fijller or more convincing account o f  the agent’s 
behaviour than he could give h i m s e l f  230
Understanding that historiography is part of intellectual history, I have tried to 
keep this remark in mind when defining historians of concepts. I have not set 
out to define people as liistorians of concepts’ who would not accept the term, 
but as this is a discipline that is rather undefined, not many historians would 
identify with it. The term is not meant as making straw-men historiography out 
o f a variety of historical approaches, but rather I have wanted to emphasise 
similarities. Other historians, in particular those involved in the HPSCG, also 
talk of history of concepts’ as a school o f thought. I have, in spite of this, tried 
to show that there are historians outside this group who also should be 
included in the definition of history o f concepts’.
In die theory chapter I defined histories of concepts as having three 
characteristics: a focus on signifiers, both synchronic and diachronic analysis, 
and a philosophical and political awareness of the historian. This is what I have 
been looking for in the books analysed in this dissertation. There are, however, 
very few who fit this definition perfectly. This dissertation must therefore be 
seen as much an attempt to look at the possibility of this approach as a 
description of the few attempts at such a methodology. The greatest difference 
between the definition and practice was found in cultural history, but this is 
not surprising since cultural history took a semiotic rather than semantic turn. 
When it comes to gender history, I believe we will see more gender history 
being influenced by linguistic gender theory combining the analytical and 
synchronic approach with diachronic historical development.^^
230 Skinner, Quentin; ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History o f  Ideas’ in History and Theory 8 (1969), p.28
231 See Moi, Torill; What is a woman? (Oxford: O xford University Press, 1999)
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The critical aspect of ‘history o f concepts’ becomes a paradox as it tries 
to uncover the power structures in history, but at the same time ‘history of 
concepts’ is an academic discipline which has power in its actions. Foucault is a 
classic example of this and Cynthia D- Coe has shown the inconsistency in the 
fact that history itself is a technique o f discipline, just as Foucault uses the term 
in Discipline and FmishP^ Historiography is in this light not about finding the 
truth at aU, but a mechanism created in the present to suppress unwanted ideas. 
Foucault becomes a victim of his own ideas. However, Foucault uses his 
power as an historian to promote the view of ‘the Other’; the mad, the victim, 
the homosexual. On the other hand, not aU historians of concepts are as 
troubled by the problems of this paradox. Along the same lines, there is a 
paradox that historians of concepts criticise older historical discourses for not 
being inclusive, but forgets that to be able to understand the importance of 
history of concepts, one has to be part of the linguistic episteme. It is necessary 
to be part of the ‘discourse’ to understand Skinner, Koselleck, Clark and Riley, 
and thus a large audience is kept outside the discourse which ‘history of 
concepts’ creates. Although concepts, vocabulary and discourse are analysed, a 
discipline will also create a new discourse with its new concepts.
In Norway, ‘history of concepts’ has shown to be of present-day 
interest as the centenary of Norwegian independence from Sweden in 1905 has 
brought history of concepts to the attention of Norwegian historians and 
journalists. This summer has brought two interesting articles; the first is a 
review by Iver Neuman of two doctoral theses on the concepts o f ‘nationality’ 
in the weekly intellectual newspaper Morgenbladet. This review article 
demonstrates that history o f concepts is being investigated and that it is an 
interest in it. The second is an article in the Norwegian historical journal, 
Historisk Tidssknfi where Halvard Leka writes ahout the peace discourse in 
Norway in the years before 1905. Central concepts are Jhd (‘peace’) and folket 
(‘people’). He seems to be aware o f the vocabulary changing, but he does not
232 Coe, p.426
233 Neuman, Iver; ‘Politikkens ”vi”’ [The "We” o f  Politics] in Morgenhladet 50.07.2004  pp.20-21. 
The doctoral dissertations he reviews are Helge Danielsen’s ‘ “Fædrelandsstnd” og  
“Fosterlandshet”: Nasjonsoppfatninger I de norske og  svenske hoyrebevegelsene i 1885-1905’ 
and Jacob Westberg’s T )en nationella drômtrâgârden. D en  stora berattelsen om  egna nationen 
i svensk och  britisk Europadebatt’.
118
mention this. He is aware how the two concepts of ‘peace’ and ‘people’ are 
linked but not of thek individual ambiguity,^ '^  ^This article seems to have the 
potential to be developed into good and critical history of concepts.
Compared with other contemporary historiographical trends, the 
history of concepts has an advanta^ of not being as vague as history of 
memory or identity. Although concepts are dealing with something as abstract 
as meaning, it is stiU quite distinct because it is founded in linguistic structures. 
StiH, history o f concepts is more of a historiographical attitude or approach 
than a different discipline. It is therefore not meant as an alternative to 
traditional historiography, but an addition. This new critical attitude has thus 
potential to penetrate various historical disciplines; cultural and gender history 
has been su^ested in this dissertation, but there are probably others as well. 
Another aspect that could be o f interest is to investigate the relationship 
between textualist historiography and concepts. Except for Michel Foucault 
and Stuart Clark, most historians portrayed here have an entirely contextual 
attitude. Perhaps concepts so far have been looked at more firom thek 
historical bacl^ound than thek linguistic powers. Perhaps, too, this is where 
the strength of histories of concepts Hes; that they stiU have more in common 
with traditional historiography than fictional writing.
234 Leira, Halvatd; ‘ “Hele vort Folk er natxurHge og  fodte Fredsvenner”’, [ “All Our People are 
B om  Friends o f  Peace”] in Historisk Tidsskrift 83 (2004), p p .l 53-80
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